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JERRY W. MARKHAM* 
The success of a speculator depends on the accuracy of his estimates, and it 
follows that where we find organized speculation we find the best perfected
facilities for securing early and accurate information.  This is one of the striking
merits of the speculative system. In any business, knowledge and foresight are 
the chief requisites of success. Nowhere do we find such strenuous efforts in this
direction as among large speculators. It may be said with scarcely an exception 
that every successful operator in the stock or grain market has been distinguished
by his unusual success in securing accurate information in advance of his 
competitors. 
With this body of keen experts, striving by the use of private wires, special agents
and every other means, to discover and foresee every event bearing on values,
speculation has been well defined as the struggle of well-equipped intelligence 
against the rough power of chance. 
—Henry Crosby Emery, 18961 
* © 2015 Jerry W. Markham.  Professor of Law, Florida International University
College of Law at Miami. 
1. Henry Crosby Emery, Speculation on the Stock and Produce Exchanges of the 
United States, in 7 STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW 116–17 (Faculty of 
Political Sci. of Colum. Univ. eds., 1896) (footnotes omitted). 
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I. ABSTRACT 
A growing concern in the stock and commodity markets over the last 
several years has been the rise of high-frequency traders (HFTs).2 Those
traders employ high-speed computer technology for the algorithmic 
origination, transmission and execution of their orders through fiber optic
cables and microwave towers.  That technology allows HFT orders to be 
executed in times measured in fractions of a second. As a result of this 
technological advance, HFTs are now dominating trading volumes.  This
phenomenon has, on the one hand, led to claims by proponents of high-
speed trading that HFTs are an important source of market liquidity and 
should not be subject to burdensome regulation. Critics of HFTs, on the 
other hand, are claiming that high-speed trading is abusive and disruptive 
for other traders. Those critics also claim that HFTs use their high-speed
advantage to trade in advance of other customers and that HFTs should be 
regulated in a manner that will remove their advantages.  This Article will 
show that concern over informational advantages of traders through “high­
2. Although this article focuses on electronic trading in the stock and commodity
markets, bond trading has also begun a migration to electronic trading platforms. See 
Nathaniel Popper, Shouts on Bond-Trading Floor Yield to Robot Beeps, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
19, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/19/shouts-on-bond-trading-floor-yield­
to-robot-beeps/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/DW9S-PA49]; see also 
Tara Bhupathi, Comment, Technology’s Latest Market Manipulator? High Frequency 
Trading: The Strategies, Tools, Risks, and Response, 11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 377, 385–91 
(2010) (discussing the modern technologies of trading markets). 
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speed” communications is not a new phenomenon.  Such advantages have 
historically been employed through communication methods that have 
included fast sailing ships, courier pigeons, stagecoaches, smoke signals, 
semaphore flags, flashing mirrors, the telegraph, and the telephone.  This 
article will also show how computerized high-speed trading transformed 
the stock and commodity markets from inefficient open outcry auctions 
to more efficient electronic trading platforms in which HFTs play an 
important role.  The article concludes that HFTs are simply a continuation
of market advances and that efforts to slow down HFTs are misguided. 
II. INTRODUCTION: HIGH-SPEED TRADING CONCERNS 
A growing concern in the stock and commodity markets over the last 
several years has been the rise of high-frequency traders (HFTs).3  HFTs 
seek advantage over other traders through the use of algorithmic trading 
programs that execute orders through high-speed fiber optic cables, 
microwaves, and even lasers.4  The speed of HFT order entry and execution 
is further enhanced by the “co-location” of their computer servers at
3. The Securities and Exchange Commission has noted that: 
One of the most significant market structure developments in recent years is high
frequency trading (HFT).  The term is relatively new and is not yet clearly defined.
It typically is used to refer to professional traders acting in a proprietary capacity
that engage in strategies that generate a large number of trades on a daily basis.
These traders could be organized in a variety of ways, including as a proprietary
trading firm (which may or may not be a registered broker-dealer and member
of FINRA), as the proprietary trading desk of a multi-service broker-dealer, or
as a hedge fund . . . . 
Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No. 34–61358, 75 
Fed. Reg. 3594, 3606 (proposed Jan. 21, 2010).  See generally e.g., SCOTT PATTERSON, 
THE QUANTS 309 (2010) (describing the development of HFTs). 
4. An advisory committee created by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
identified the following as attributes of a HFT:
(a)	 Algorithms for decision making, order initiation, generation, routing, or 
execution, for each individual transaction without human direction; 
(b) 	low-latency technology that is designed to minimize response times, 
including proximity and co-location services; 
(c)	 high speed connections to markets for order entry; and
(d) 	 recurring high message rates (orders, quotes or cancellations) determined 
using one or more objective forms of measurement, including (i) cancel-to­
fill ratios; (ii) participant-to-market message ratios; or (iii) participant-to­
market trade volume ratios. 
Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading
Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. 56,542, 56,545 (proposed Sept. 12, 2013) (footnote omitted) 
[hereinafter Risk Controls and System Safeguards]. 
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specially built exchange facilities.5  These communication advantages 
allow HFTs to shave microseconds off trade origination and execution 
times, providing advantage over traders that do not have such high-speed
capabilities.6 
As will be described below, the quest for “high-speed” trading advantages 
is not a new phenomenon.  High-speed traders in earlier centuries employed
communication mediums that were faster than the norm at the time.7 Such 
devices have included fast sailing ships, courier pigeons, express coaches,
smoke and hand signals, semaphore flags, mirrors, the telegraph, and private 
telephone lines.8  Those advances in communication initially benefitted 
individual speculators who were the first to employ them, but concerns 
were voiced that those “high-speed” traders were taking advantage of 
slower speed market participants.9  There was, however, another side of 
5.  Senator John McCain (R. Ariz) described co-location as follows: 
Another key tactic used by high-frequency trading firms is co-location.  This 
practice involves trading firms literally renting space for their computers in the 
same room as the computers that run the stock exchanges so that they can receive 
market information directly from the exchanges’ computers as fast as possible. 
The investors that don’t buy this direct connection to the exchanges receive 
market data via a government-established system using out-of-date technology
called the Securities Information Processor that compiles market data much 
more slowly. 
Conflicts of Interest, Investor Loss of Confidence, and High Speed Trading in U.S. Stock 
Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland
Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 5 (2014) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of 
Sen. John McCain, Member, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg89752/pdf/CHRG-113shrg89752.pdf [http://
perma.cc/VV6D-QZKW]. 
6. The Securities and Exchange Commission has noted that “[u]nlike years ago, 
trades today are transacted in milliseconds or faster and dispersed among many trading 
centers.  These changes have allowed large market participants to employ sophisticated 
trading methods to trade electronically on multiple venues in huge volumes at very fast 
speeds.”  Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Large Trader Reporting
Regime, No. 2011-154 (July 26, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-154.htm
[http://perma.cc/Y2N6-DPEY]. Microwave transmissions were becoming increasingly
popular in 2014 for HFTs.  Jesse Westbrook et al., High-Frequency Traders Find Microwaves
Suit Their Need for Speed, BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 24, 2014), http://www.businessweek. 
com/articles/2014-07-24/high-frequency-traders-find-microwaves-suit-their-need-for-speed 
[http://perma.cc/LS4K-SZ4X]. 
7. Bob Pisani, Plundered by Harpies: An Early History of High-Speed Trading, 
FIN. HIST., Fall 2014, at 21. 
8. Id. at 21–23. 
9. Scott Patterson, SEC Chairman Targets Dark Pools, High-Speed Trading, 
WALL ST. J. (June 6, 2014) http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-chairman-unveils-sweeping­
proposals-to-improve-markets-1401986097 [http://perma.cc/R944-9QWM]; see also 
PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 309 (“[R]egulators were concerned.  The Securities and
Exchange Commission was worried about a rising trend of high-frequency trading firms 
that were getting so-called naked access to exchanges from brokerages that lent out their
computer identification codes.”). 
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the coin that those critics largely ignored.  The introduction of ever-faster 
communication methods transformed stock and commodity markets from 
local exchanges with little liquidity into international markets that
dominated international finance.10 
Twentieth century markets thus benefitted from ever-higher speed 
trading advances, but were still hampered by the slow paced “open
outcry” auction markets that emerged from the nineteenth century.11  The 
computer was only solely integrated into those markets and did not fully
arrive until this century.12  The modern HFT is the by-product of a much-
needed shift from the inefficient and sometimes abusive open outcry 
trading floors of exchanges to the modern electronic trading platform.13 
Before the advent of electronic trading platforms, traders on the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) would typically formulate orders in their heads 
based on some market signal they viewed to be favorable.14  The trader 
would phone the order into a broker’s trading desk, usually located on or 
near a market center.15  The broker would transmit the order to a floor 
broker on the trading floor by messenger, hand signals or pneumatic tubes.16 
The floor broker would then take the order to the NYSE specialist’s post 
10. Stijn Claessens et al., Explaining the Migration of Stocks from Exchanges in
Emerging Economies to International Centres 2, (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research,
Discussion Paper No. 3301, 2002), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
311119 [http://perma.cc/45B7-CTBJ]. 
11. PAOLO PEZZUTTI, TRADING THE US MARKETS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO US 
MARKETS FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADERS AND INVESTORS 5, 21–22, 63 (2008). 
12. See Craig Pirrong, Upstairs, Downstairs: Electronic vs. Open Outcry Exchanges 
3 (Feb. 19, 2003) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Houston Bauer
College of Business), http://www.bauer.uh.edu/spirrong/upstairs1.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
S5PX-Y2BT]; Pisani, supra note 7, at 23. 
13. See Tom Polansek, Insight: Chicago Pits Going Quiet, 165 Years After Shouting
Began, REUTERS (Aug. 5, 2013, 10:47 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/05/ 
us-cme-grain-pits-insight-idUSBRE9740EC20130805 [http://perma.cc/R4AP-7PK7].
 14. See SCOTT PATTERSON, DARK POOLS 273 (2012); CFA Level 1: Derivatives— 
The Futures Trade Process, INVESTOPEDIA, http://investopedia.com/exam-guide/cfa-level-1/ 
derivatives/futures-trade-process.asp [http://perma.cc/M57C-RBGG] (last visited Sept. 12,
2015) [hereinafter CFA Level 1: Derivatives].
15. Asani Sarkar & Michelle Tozzi, Electronic Trading on Futures Exchanges, 
CURRENT ISSUES ECON. & FIN., Jan. 1998, at 1, 1–2. 
16. See Pisani, supra note 7, at 23; CFA Level 1: Derivatives, supra note 14 
(discussing hand signals). 
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where a listed stock was traded for execution.17  The process would be
reversed to report the execution of the order.18 
This process was slow, cumbersome, and costly because commissions 
had to be paid to brokers.19  The specialist was also paid a costly fee in the
form of the spread he quoted between his bid and ask quotes.20  The order 
execution process was similarly cumbersome in the over-the-counter 
(OTC) market where competing market makers had to be consulted in 
order to assure the best execution price for orders.21 There too
commissionsȄor markups or markdowns—and spreads had to be paid to 
brokers and market makers.22 
The slowness of this process raised further costs concerns from
“latency” and “slippage.”  Latency is the period of delay that occurs
between the time an order is formulated and the time that it is executed.23 
The slower the execution process, the greater is the latency associated
with the order.24  Slippage is a reference to the potential change in the
price of an investment between the time a trade is contemplated or entered
and its execution.25  Delays in the order entry process, namely latency, 
exposes a trader to greater risks of slippage and lost trading opportunities.26 
17.  George Sofianos & Ingrid M. Werner, The Trades of NYSE Floor Brokers, 3 J. 
FIN. MARKETS 139, 140 (2000). 
18. See Understanding Order Execution, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia. 
com/articles/01/022801.asp [http://perma.cc/25HF-3KU4] (last visited Sept. 12, 2015). 
19. See Open Outcry, INVESTOPEDIA.http://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/open 
outcry.asp [http://perma.cc/PYK8-NPTM] (last visited Sept. 12, 2015); Jason Van Bergen, 
Paying Your Investment Advisor—Fees or Commissions?, http://www.investopedia.com/
articles/basics/04/022704.asp [http://perma.cc/L5QU-3N4E] (last visited Sept. 12, 2015). 
20.  Kenneth D. Garbade & William L. Silber, Price Dispersion in the Government 
Securities Market, 84 J. POL. ECON. 721, 736 (1976). 
21. See BD. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, REGULATORY ISSUES RAISED BY
CHANGES IN MARKET STRUCTURE 16–17 (2013), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/ 
affairs/AffairsIOSCO/201402/P020140213531132659111.pdf [http://perma.cc/WG2W­
P2QR]; Understanding Order Execution, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ 
articles/01/022801.asp [http://perma.cc/AZT9-X9EF] (last visited Sept. 12, 2015). 
22. Sec. Inst. of Am., Inc., Series 55: Commissions and Trade Complaints - Broker 
vs. Dealer, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/study-guide/series-55/commissions­
and-trade-complaints/broker-vs-dealer/ [http://perma.cc/UTM8-S6YC] (last visited Sept. 
12, 2015). 
23. Bhupathi, supra note 2, at 386 n.52. 
24. Michael J. McGowan, Comment, The Rise of Computerized High Frequency 
Trading: Use and Controversy, DUKE L. & TECH. REV., no. 016, 2010, at ¶ 16. 
25. IRENE ALDRIDGE, HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
ALGORITHMIC STRATEGIES AND TRADING SYSTEMS 43–44 (2d ed. 2013). 
26. See Goldstein v. Mortenson, 113 S.W.3d 769, 773 (Tex. App. 2003) (“The time 
expended in placing phone calls allowed market positions . . . to change, often resulting in
serious losses . . . .  The negative effect resulting from such a delay is known in the 
industry as ‘slippage.’”). 
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HFTs seek to minimize latency and slippage through the formulation 
and transmission of their orders by computer algorithms and high-speed
data transmission devices.27  One HFT group spent $300 million to build 
a high-speed data line between New Jersey and Chicago in order to reduce 
order latency by three milliseconds.28  Another fiber optic project sought
to cut five milliseconds off order entry between London and New York at
a cost of a projected $500 million.29 Microwave transmissions are even 
faster.30  The most recent development in the effort to reduce latency is
the use of laser communications.31 
The efficiencies achieved by the high-speed transmission and execution 
of their orders made HFTs successful.32  The specialists on the NYSE and 
27. See ALDRIDGE, supra note 25, at 17, 23–24; Bhupathi, supra note 2, at 386-87. 
28. PATTERSON, supra note 14, at 287. 
29. Id. at 288. 
30. MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS 267 (2014). 
31. See Scott Patterson, Traders with Need for Speed Turn to Laser Beams, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 12, 2014, at A1. 
32. The prospectus of a HFT firm, which was proposing to go public before HFT 
trading activities were engulfed in controversy, advertised that it was: 
[A] leading technology-enabled market maker and liquidity provider to the 
global financial markets. We stand ready, at any time, to buy or sell a broad
range of securities, and we generate revenue by buying and selling large volumes 
of securities and other financial instruments and earning small amounts of
money based on the difference between what buyers are willing to pay and what 
sellers are willing to accept, which we refer to as “bid/ask spreads.”  We make
markets by providing quotations to buyers and sellers in more than 10,000
securities and other financial instruments on more than 210 unique exchanges, 
markets and liquidity pools in 30 countries around the world.  We believe that 
our broad diversification, in combination with our proprietary technology
platform and low-cost structure, enables us to facilitate risk transfer between 
global capital markets participants by supplying liquidity and competitive 
pricing while at the same time earning attractive margins and returns. 
We believe that market makers like us serve an important role in maintaining 
and improving the overall health and efficiency of the global capital markets by
continuously posting bids and offers for securities and other financial
instruments and thereby providing to market participants an efficient means to 
transfer risk.  All market participants benefit from the increased liquidity, lower 
overall trading costs and enhanced execution certainty that we provide.  While 
in most cases we do not have customers in a traditional sense, we make markets 
for global banks, brokers and other intermediaries, in addition to retail and 
institutional investors, including corporations, individuals, hedge funds, mutual
funds, pension funds and other investors, all of whom desire to transfer risk in 
multiple securities and asset classes for their own accounts and/or on behalf of
their customers. 
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market makers on Nasdaq, who traditionally filled liquidity gaps in that
market, are now pretty much outdated.33  Instead, HFTs are dominating 
markets and driving trading volumes on both the stock and commodity
markets.34  By 2009, some two-thirds of stock-market volume was 
attributable to “high-frequency traders, who can buy or sell in less than
400 microseconds, or nearly a thousand times faster than you can blink 
your eye.”35  HFTs’ trading volume appears to have dropped in more 
recent years, but were still estimated to be accounting for more than half
of all stock market trading volume in June 2014.36 Trading volumes in the
futures markets are also dominated by HFTs.37  However, critics of HFTs 
claim that their high-speed trading is, at least in some instances, abusive 
and disruptive of orderly markets.38  Those critics seek regulation of HFTs 
in order to handicap their trading advantages.39  Countering those claims 
Virtu Fin., Inc., Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933 (Form S-1) (Mar. 
10, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1592386/000104746914002070/a22 
18589zs-1.htm#dm16701_business [https://perma.cc/7FKX-Q2BB]. 
33. LEWIS, supra note 30, at 3. 
34. Dennis K. Berman, The Game: Saving the Stock Market Only To Destroy It, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2010, at C1. 
35. Jason Zweig, The Intelligent Investor: Staying Calm in a World of Dark Pools, 
Dark Doings, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2009, at B1. 
36. Scott Patterson, High-Speed Traders Face Tighter Reins, WALL ST. J., June 6, 
2014, at C1. 
37. GARY SHORTER & RENA S. MILLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43608 HIGH­
FREQUENCY TRADING: BACKGROUND, CONCERNS, AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 27– 
28 (2014), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43608.pdf [http://perma.cc/6GRJ-BDQW].  The
Commodity Futures Trading Commission has noted that: 
An established body of data indicates the importance of electronic and algorithmic
trading in U.S. futures markets.  In 2012, approximately 91.50% of exchange 
trading volume in U.S. futures markets was executed electronically.  Estimates 
indicate that algorithmic trading first accounted for at least 50% of orders in
2009, and accounted for over 40% of total trading volume in 2010 . . . . 
Increased automation in both order generation and matching, combined with the
exponentially faster communication networks . . . has in many cases reduced the
trade lifecycle to as little as a few milliseconds.  As a result, high-frequency trading 
(“HFT”) strategies have also become an increasingly important component of 
automated trading environments. 
Risk Controls and System Safeguards, supra note 4, at 56,545. 
38. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 30. 
39. Sam Mamudi & Nick Baker, Mary Jo White Gets High-Frequency Embrace 
with SEC Plan, BLOOMBERG BUS. (June 5, 2014, 9:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2014-06-06/mary-jo-white-gets-high-frequency-embrace-with-sec-plan [http://perma. 
cc/L59B-ZX63].  Hearings were held in Congress in 2014 that considered the need for
such regulation. See Hearing, supra note 5.
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are studies that show that HFTs provide liquidity and actually stabilize 
markets.40 
The related development of unregulated “dark pools,” that is, non­
public markets where orders are executed without the public scrutiny
available for regulated exchange trading, has aroused further concerns.41 
Dark pools are anonymous trading platforms for trading stock listed on
public markets.42  Orders placed through an exchange are visible to the
public and all other market participants, but an order or an indication of 
interest entered on a dark pool is revealed only to other dark pool
participants.43 This gives dark pool participants access to information 
unavailable to the public.44 
A popular book has condemned HFTs and essentially charged those 
traders with improperly front running orders of other traders through their 
advanced trading techniques.45  Especially criticized were trading programs 
that took advantage of SEC regulations that had tried to equalize trading 
opportunities.46  HFTs were using the requirement that investors receive
 40. See, e.g., HFT Stabilises Modern Markets—Academic Research, AUTOMATED
TRADER (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.automatedtrader.net/news/at/152493/hft-stabilises­
modern-markets—academic-research [http://perma.cc/YJ6T-YCAS].
 41. See  PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 311 (2010); Patterson, supra note 9. It was 
estimated in June 2014 that forty percent of U.S. stock trades were occurring on dark pools. 
Cameron Smith, Stock Investors Can Handle the Truth, WALL ST. J., June 3, 2014, at A11. 
The SEC has noted that unreported trades are not unique only to dark pools: 
In general, dark liquidity (that is, trading interest that is not included in the 
consolidated quotation data) is not a new phenomenon.  Market participants that 
need to trade in large size, such as institutional investors, always have sought
ways to minimize their transaction costs by completing their trades without 
prematurely revealing the full extent of their trading interest to the broader
market . . . . In addition, broker-dealers acting as over-the-counter (‘OTC’) market 
makers and block positioners long have provided liquidity directly to their 
customers that is not reflected in the consolidated quotation data. 
Regulation of Non-Public Trading Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 34-60997, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 61,208–09 (proposed Nov. 23, 2009). 
42. Austin J. Sandler, The Invisible Power of Machines: Revisiting the Proposed
Flash Order Ban in the Wake of the Flash Crash, 2011 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 003, ¶ 7 
n.18., http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1217&context=dltr [http:// 
perma.cc/J2SW-WZJC].
 43. Id. ¶ 6, 7. 
44. See id.
 45. LEWIS, supra note 30. 
46. SHORTER & MILLER, supra note 37, at 19. 
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the best price available anywhere on public markets to anticipate trades 
on multiple markets and profit from that opportunity.47 
Exposure of this practice set off a public outcry in the press.48 
Regulators and politicians saw an opportunity to grab headlines by targeting
those traders for prosecutions and new rules.  The New York Attorney 
General launched a broad scale investigation into the trading practices of 
HFTs in April 2014.49  That probe was later expanded into the dark pools
operated by Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., and other large banks.50  The  
New York Attorney General, shortly afterwards, charged Barclays PLC 
for misrepresenting the access it provided to its dark pool by HFTs.51 
The SEC responded with its own investigation of dark pools in order to 
determine whether they were undermining the integrity of U.S. markets.52 
The SEC also proposed rules that would attempt to move trading from
dark pools to the public exchanges and subject HFTs to regulation by
requiring them to register with the agency as broker-dealers.53  FINRA 
began an investigation of customer order routing practices by broker-
dealers to determine if orders were being sent to execution centers on the
basis of payments for that order flow rather than the best execution price.54
 47. See Hearing supra note 6, at 5 (describing that concern). 
48. See, e.g., Jacob Goldstein, Trading Places, N.Y. TIMES ABSTRACTS, Oct. 13, 
2013, at 14 (“high-frequency traders often can foil long-term investors by trading ahead 
of slower players”); Jacob Goldstein, Putting a Speed Limit on the Stock Market, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/13/magazine/high-frequency­
traders.html [http://perma.cc/92VG-2VUD]; Eric Levenson & Dashiell Bennett, Is High-
Frequency Trading as Bad as Michael Lewis Wants You to Think?, THE WIRE (Apr. 1,
2014, 6:28 PM), http://www.thewire.com/business/2014/04/is-high-frequency-trading-as­
bad-as-michael-lewis-wants-you-to-think/359903/ [http://perma.cc/89WS-2B95]; Sam Mamudi, 
Charlie Munger: HFT is Legalized Front-Running, BARRON’S (May 3, 2013, 1:25 PM),
http://blogs.barrons.com/stockstowatchtoday/2013/05/03/charlie-munger-hft-is-legalized­
front-running/ [http://perma.cc/NGZ6-EUJ9].
 49. Scott Patterson, Subpoenas Are Sent to Fast-Trading Firms, WALL ST. J., Apr.
17, 2014, at C2. 
50. Justin Baer & Scott Patterson, Banks Draw Trading Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., May 
10, 2014, at B2. 
51. Scott Patterson & Andrew R. Johnson, Barclays Sued Over ‘Dark Pool,’ WALL 
ST. J., June 26, 2014, at C1. 
52. Scott Patterson, Jean Eaglesham & Bradley Hope, ‘Dark Pools’ Face New SEC
Probe, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2014, at C1. 
53. Andrew Ackerman & Bradley Hope, SEC Set to Spur Exchange Trading, WALL 
ST. J., May 27, 2014, at C1; Patterson, supra note 36; William Alden, S.E.C. Chief Offers 
Rules to Govern Fast Trading, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2014, at B1.  The SEC appeared to be 
following Germany’s lead, which enacted legislation in 2013 that requires high-frequency
traders (HFTs) to register with the government and subjects those traders to special 
organizational requirements.  Tim Cave, German Firm Quits Over Tough High-Frequency 
Trading Rules, WALL ST. J. (June 5, 2013, 12:30 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/
06/05/german-firm-quits-over-tough-high-frequency-trading-rules/. 
54. Scott Patterson, FINRA Opens Broker-Routing Inquiry, WALL ST. J., July 9,
2014, at C3. 
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The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) launched a separate 
investigation of incentive arrangements that sought to attract HFTs to
particular trading platforms.55 
Congress also could not resist the publicity over HFTs. The Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations scheduled hearings in June 
2014 on HFTs to determine whether their trading was injurious to the 
markets and whether trading incentives used to attract orders to particular 
trading platforms were appropriate.56  Those trading incentives involve
“payment for order flow” from market makers to brokers as an incentive 
to route customer orders to the payer for execution.57  Another practice of
concern are “maker-taker” payments, in which an electronic trading platform
charges fees or pays incentives for order depending on whether the parties 
to an executed order initiated the trade or whether they accepted the 
initiating order.58 
Regulators and industry participants have raised further concerns over 
the fragmentation of trading among electronic trading platforms and
traditional trading venues.  As 2014 began, there were thirteen public
exchanges and some fifty “Alternative Trading Systems,” namely, non-
exchange electronic trading platforms, that were open to HFTs.59 
Compounding that complex array of markets, SEC “Regulation NMS
(National Market System) requires brokers to route their customer orders 
to the exchange displaying the best available public price at any given 
time.”60  This requirement has been used by HFTs to anticipate orders
55. Scott Patterson & Jenny Strasburg, High-Speed Trading Firms Face New U.S. 
Scrutiny, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 18, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001
424052702303287804579447610625554506 [http://perma.cc/DY3C-KXZU]. 
56. Sarah N. Lynch, Senate Panel to Probe High-Speed Trading, Broker Conflicts, 
REUTERS (June 9, 2014, 5:46PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/09/us-senate­
markets-idUSKBN0EK20K20140609 [http://perma.cc/3G2J-HHX4].
57. Robert Battalio, Andriya Shikilko & Robert Van Ness, To Pay or be Paid? The 
Impact of Taker Fees and Order Flow Inducements on Trading Costs in U.S. Options
Markets, 1 (Nov. 3, 2011). 
58. William Alden, Senate Hearing on Fairness of High-Speed Stock Trading
Could Get Heated, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2014, at B5; Scott Patterson, Senate Turns Gaze
to Superfast Trading, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2014, at C3.  The Congressional Research 
Service also did an extensive report on HFTs. SHORTER & MILLER, supra note 37, at 34– 
36.
 59. Gary Cohn, The Responsible Way to Rein in Super-Fast Trading, WALL ST. J.  

















     
 






















complying with that requirement and to trade in front of those orders.61 
Another concern is that the high message traffic generated by HFTs is 
overwhelming the ability of markets and traders to deal with that volume,
and a number of computer glitches on exchanges have resulted in trading 
halts and alarming market crashes.62
 61. 	LEWIS, supra note 30.  As was noted in Senate hearings on this issue: 
One of the most predatory high-frequency trading practices depends on the on 
unintended consequences of the SEC’s Regulation National Market System, or
Reg NMS. That regulation essentially mandated that investment firms must buy
or sell stocks at the best price available. While that might sound like a reasonable
requirement, hi-frequency trading firms can take advantage of the rule by putting
out offers to buy or sell small amounts of stock at attractive prices.  When a large 
investor, seeking to make a big order, accepts the high-frequency trading firm’s 
offer because it is the best price available, the high-frequency trader can predict
that the large investor will have to go to another exchange to purchase the rest 
of his order.  The high-frequency trader can then race ahead of that investor to
the other exchange, buy up all available shares, and sell them to the large investor at
a higher price. 
Hearing, supra note 6.
62. Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated
Trading Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. 56542, 56549, 56551 (Sept. 12, 2013) (footnotes
omitted); see LEWIS, supra note 31, at 200, 202; Andrew Smith, Fast Money: The Battle 
Against the High Frequency Traders, THE GUARDIAN (June 7, 2014), http://www.the 
guardian.com/business/2014/jun/07/inside-murky-world-high-frequency-trading [http://
perma.cc/42CM-N4C8].  The Commodity Futures Trading Commission has noted that 
errors in order transmissions have sometimes disrupted markets: 
Increased interconnectedness encourages price efficiencies when economically
identical or related contracts are traded on multiple exchanges.  However, it also
increases the speed with which a disruption on one trading platform, or within
one ATS or algorithm, can impact related markets. For example, a trading
platform may experience changes in the prices, spreads or volatility of one or 
more of its products due to errors in an ATS or algorithm active in its markets. 
Even if this algorithm does not trade elsewhere, such changes are likely to 
quickly impact the prices, spreads, and volatility of related products on other
platforms, as automated systems attempt to arbitrage price differences.  The
potential result is a cascading series of market disruptions, brought about by the 
malfunction of a single ATS or algorithm trading on a single platform. 
Transmission effects such as this are illustrated by events like the May 6, 2010
“Flash Crash.” On that day, major equity indices in both the futures and
securities markets fell over 5% in minutes before recovering almost as quickly. 
After investigation by both the Commission and the SEC, it was found that a 
fundamental seller utilized an automated execution algorithm to sell 75,000 E-
mini contracts (valued at approximately $4.1 billion) over an abbreviated time 
interval.  The algorithm placed orders based on recent trading volume but was
not programmed to take price or time into account; because of this lapse, a feedback 
loop triggered continued orders from the algorithm even as prices moved far 
beyond traditional daily ranges. Like the hypothetical example provided above, 
these declines in the derivatives market quickly filtered over to different, but
closely related, products on many other exchanges.  Soon after the initial moves 
in the E-mini contract, similar extreme volatility was experienced by the S&P 
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Part III of this article will describe early high-speed trading techniques 
and the concerns they raised.  Part IV will describe twentieth century stock 
and commodity markets and the inefficiencies they engendered from their
lack of automation.  Part V will show how those markets were automated
and fostered HFTs. Part VI describes the concerns raised by HFTs and
current efforts to regulate their activities. 
III. EARLY HIGH-SPEED TRADERS 
A. From Telescopes to Carrier Pigeons 
A Japanese document written in 1706 recounts the tale of a merchant 
who obtained considerable market advantage by having messengers use 
hand signals to forewarn him of rice price changes at the Osaka rice 
market. The merchant was able to observe those signals from several 
miles away in Koriyama through a telescope.  This information gave the 
merchant an advantage over other merchants, and he was able to profit 
greatly from that information.  That merchant’s scheme, however, received
a setback after a drunken messenger was late and became confused over
500 SPDR exchange traded fund and by many of the 500 underlying securities 
which make up the index itself. 
Risk Controls and System Safeguards, supra note 5, at 56547.  Later, the CFTC and the 
Department of Justice brought civil and criminal charges against a trader charging that an
algorithm he used had also contributed to the May 6, 2010 Flash Crash. See Peter J. 
Henning, The Fine Line Between Smart and Illegal, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/28/business/dealbook/the-fine-line-between-smart-and
-illegal.html [http://perma.cc/7TTD-353J] (describing those charges). The Senior
Supervisors Group, an international body for coordinating international supervision of
financial markets) has recommended stronger internal supervision and risk controls for
HFTs. John McCrank, Global Bank Regulators Call for More Risk Controls Around Algo 
Trading, REUTERS (Apr. 30, 2015, 3:42 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/
04/30/us-banks-regulator-algotrading-idUSKBN0NL2I320150430 [http://perma.cc/NWB4­
JM72]. The SEC, by consent sanctioned Knight Capital for failing to maintain adequate 
safeguards to prevent the entry of millions of erroneous orders that disrupted the stock
markets on August 1, 2012.  Knight Capital Americas LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 
70694, 2 (2013). The errors occurred as a result of a programming error in allowing 
customer access to a NYSE Retail Liquidity Program.  Knight Capital Americas LLC, 
Exchange Act Release No. 70694, 5–6 (2013).  This conduct was found to have violated
SEC Rule 15c3-5, [17 C.F.R. § 15c3-5], which requires broker-dealers to implement 
controls to guard against risks posed by the direct market access of broker-dealers and their
customers.  Knight Capital Americas LLC, Exchange Act Release No.  70694, 4 (2013).  This
rule requires broker-dealers to prevent automated system errors, outages and other failures 
and to mitigate the effects of such problems when they do occur. Id. 
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the proper hand signals. The merchant suffered large losses when he acted
on an erroneous signal sent by the messenger.63 
Rice futures trading in Japan during that era were also using other high-
speed communications to foster trading and obtain market advantage.  By
1716, rice traders were employing “elaborate communications systems 
based on smoke signals, flag signals, and carrier pigeons” that enabled 
traders and brokers to transmit information between Japanese cities at a 
distance of 350 miles with “great speed.”64 
Fast sailing ships were long used in Europe for obtaining information 
that could be used to profit from price changes in securities65  In the  
eighteenth century, Sir Henry Furnese, “throughout Holland, Flanders,
France and Germany, . . . maintained a complete and perfect train of 
intelligence . . . the fall of Namur added to his profits, owing to his early 
intelligence.”66 
Traders were able to profit handsomely by short selling the stock of the 
East India Company in 1773, after receiving advance knowledge of the 
Boston Tea Party.67  The tea destroyed in that affair was shipped from the
East India Company on consignment to colonial merchants.68  The East 
India Company was in financial trouble at the time and was being bailed
out by the British government.69  A part of that effort was legislation that
granted the company a monopoly on tea shipped to the American colonies.70 
However, the Crown refused to remove a tax on that tea that was abhorrent 
to many in the colonies.71 The Boston Tea Party was a protest against 
such taxation without representation.72  The loss of the tea destroyed in 
that raid caused a sharp drop in the price of the East India Company’s 
63. David Moss & Eugene Kintgen, The Dojima Rice Market and the Origins of
Futures Trading, HARV. BUS. SCH., Case Study No. 9-709-044 (Nov. 10, 2010) (Appendix),
http://disciplinas.stoa.usp.br/pluginfile.php/69204/mod_resource/content/4/CHY%20GE 
D_LS-%23795938-v1-Dojima_Rice_Market_Case.pdf [http://perma.cc/VY7U-F8NP]. 
64. Id. See also Mark D. West,  Private Ordering at the World’s First Futures 
Exchange, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2574, 2586–87 (2000) (noting the use of this communication 
method to transmit messages on rice prices between Tokyo and Dojima). 
65. See generally Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300
Years of Evidence, 75 WASHINGTON UNIV. L.Q. 849, 850 (1997). 
66. Emery, supra note 2, at 116 n.3 (citations omitted). 
67. NICK BUNKER, EMPIRE ON EDGE 239 (2014). 
68. Significance of the Tea Act, 1773, BOSTON TEA PARTY HISTORICAL SOCIETY, 
http://www.boston-tea-party.org/tea-act.html [http://perma.cc/6HQD-EFLP] (last visited 
Sept. 12, 2015). 
69. The Tea Act: The Catalyst of the Boston Tea Party, BOSTON TEA PARTY, 
http://www.bostonteapartyship.com/the-tea-act [http://perma.cc/57RZ-RJXR] (last visited 
Sept. 12, 2015). 
70. Id.
 71. Id.
 72. Id. 
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stock.73  Traders receiving advance information of that destruction from 
fast sailing ships anticipated that decline and were able to reap profits 
from those less informed.74  This information disparity was due in part to
the fact that the British navy, which carried the Royal mails, used a slower 
route to travel back from America than did commercial vessels.75 
After the Revolution, fast coaches drawn by horses and sailing ships 
were used to speed market information in the United States.76  Within a 
year of the founding of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange in 1790, express 
coaches were speeding to Philadelphia from New York.77  Those coaches 
carried news from ships docking in New York that could affect security 
prices on the Philadelphia exchange.78  “Philadelphia brokers learned to 
dread the sudden appearance of a stagecoach full of Wall Streeters 
because it meant that they were in exclusive possession of important news 
from London that might make them a small fortune.”79 
Express coaches played a similar role after the approval by Congress in 
1790 of Alexander Hamilton’s plan to refund the Revolutionary War 
debt.80  That debt was virtually worthless before that funding scheme was 
approved, but became quite valuable when Congress agreed to refund it 
at par.81  Those receiving advance news of that plan quickly hired express 
coaches and fast sailing ships, directing them to various cities and locals 
to purchase the old debt at steep discounts for redemption at par.82 There 
was much criticism of members of Congress who participated in these 
73. BUNKER, supra note 67, at 239. 
74. Id.
 75. Id. at 320. 
76. Philadelphia Stock Exchange Papers, THE HIST. SOC. OF PENN., Collection 
3070, 1, 1, http://hsp.org/sites/default/files/legacy_files/migrated/findingaid3070phlx.pdf
[http://perma.cc/K27S-BVWQ]. 
77. Id. 
78. 	  As the Philadelphia Stock Exchange later noted: 
[t]he speeding coaches that clattered from New York to Philadelphia carried
speculators and stockjobbers, agents of foreign investors, and inside traders with
privileged information that could move the market, and make their fortune at the 
expense of the Philadelphia merchants. 
Philadelphia Stock Exchange, THE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF PENNSYLVANIA 1 (2006). 
79. JOHN STEELE GORDON, THE GREAT GAME: THE EMERGENCE OF WALL STREET 
AS A WORLD OF POWER 1653-2000, at 78 (1999). 
80. ROBERT IRVING WARSHOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 123 (1931). See also  RON 
CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 297–306 (2004) (describing the political fights over 
this refunding measure). 
81. WARSHOW, supra note 80, at 123.
 82. Id. at 123–24. 
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purchases or tipped others.83  Thomas Jefferson called that effort a “base 
scramble.”84  However, it was not until some 220 years later that Congress 
passed the STOCK Act of 2012, which now prohibits such insider trading 
by members of Congress.85 
Advance information, received from a British sailing ship, of the
signing of the Treaty of Ghent that ended the War of 1812 led to large 
profits by a speculator in New Orleans that resulted in a famous Supreme 
Court case.86  It appeared that, on the night of February 18, 1815, certain 
merchants received word from the British fleet that the treaty of Ghent 
had been signed by the American and British commissioners—an event
that had already been published in the British press.87  This news was  
made public in New Orleans through a handbill distributed at 8:00 a.m.
on Sunday morning, February 19, 1815.88  A merchant in the house Peter 
Laidlaw & Co., who had earlier received that information, arranged to 
purchase 111 hogsheads of tobacco soon after sunrise on that same 
Sunday morning from another merchant who was unaware of the treaty.89 
The value of the tobacco sold in that transaction increased from thirty to 
fifty percent once information about the treaty became widely known.90 
That increase in value was due to the effect that the treaty would have on 
the reopening European markets to American tobacco.91 The selling 
merchant reclaimed the tobacco after learning of the treaty and the issue 
made its way to the Supreme Court, where Justice John Marshall ruled 
that the purchaser had no duty to disclose that information to the seller.92
 83. See 1 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 
FROM CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS TO THE ROBBER BARONS (1492-1900) 80 (2002) (describing
that scandal). 
84. WARSHOW, supra note 80, at 123. Jefferson was appalled at this activity and 
charged that:
[c]ouriers and relay-horses by land, and swift sailing boats by sea, were flying 
in all directions. Active partners and agents were associated and employed in
every state, town and country neighborhood; and this paper was bought for five 
shillings, and even as low as two shillings, in the pound, before the holder knew 
that Congress had already provided for its redemption at par. Immense sums 
were thus filched from the poor and ignorant, and fortunes accumulated by those 
who had themselves been poor enough before. 
Id. at 123–24. 
85. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 
112–105; 126 Stat. 292. 
86.  Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. 178 (1817). 
87. Id. at 182–83. 
88. Id. at 183. 
89. Id. at 181, 183. 
90. Id. at 183. 
91. Nicola W. Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required During Precontractual
Negotiations, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 70, 122 (1993) (citation omitted). 
92. Laidlaw, 15 U.S. at 181. 
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The House of Rothschild regularly employed human couriers to provide 
advance news of market moving events in the nineteenth century.93 
Nathan Rothschild famously acted on advance news of Wellington’s 
victory at Waterloo in 1815 that was supplied by an agent who had sped 
to England aboard a fast ship after the battle.94  Rothschild used that 
information to purchase British government bonds that rose in value when
knowledge of the victory became generally known.95  “Unfortunately—as
with every innovation in communications—it was not long before the 
Rothschilds’ rivals were sending just as many couriers of their own.”96 
To regain advantage, Rothschild turned to carrier pigeons to send market
information from European cities to London.  Using a crude code, messages
sent by this method would advise whether to buy or sell securities.97 
An increase in cotton prices in Liverpool, England in 1824 provided a 
profit opportunity for U.S. speculators.98 When that news arrived in New 
York, special packets were sent south directing cotton purchases, and 
other methods were used to obtain advantage through special expresses 
that were much faster than those available through the U.S. mail system,
which was then the normal method for transmitting and making public 
news reports of market moving events.99  As one author noted:
[S]peculators sent packets to Southern cotton markets. The messenger who
arrived first made substantial profits for his employer by purchasing cotton at
normal prices.  This was hardly an isolated occurrence.  Speculators in Eastern ports,
especially New York, sought advance information about fluctuations in distant 
93.  John Maxwell Hamilton & Eric Jenner, Essay, The New Foreign Correspondence, 
FOR. AFF. 131, 133 (Sept.–Oct. 2003). 
94. Joseph Mandel, The Richest Dynasty in History?, BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 1998), 
http://www.businessweek.com/1998/49/b3607071.htm [http://perma.cc/2H6A-6UYR].
95. Nathan Mayer Rothschild and ‘Waterloo’ ROTHSCHILD ARCHIVE, https://www. 
rothschildarchive.org/contact/faqs/nathan_mayer_rothschild_and_waterloo [https://perma.cc/ 
5LRA-9P6F] (last visited Sept. 12, 2015). 
96. NIALL FERGUSON, THE HOUSE OF ROTHSCHILD: MONEY PROPHETS (1798-1848)
234 (1998). 
97. Id.  Ironically, notice of Nathan Rothschild’s death in Europe in 1836 was sent 
to London by courier pigeon. “[A] sportsman, looking for birds in the neighborhood of
Brighton, on the English coast, shot a pigeon which, when picked up, proved to be one of
the well-known carrier-pigeons of the Rothschilds. Under its wings was a small piece of
paper, bearing the words: ‘Il est mort.’” A Tale of Great Fortunes, 5 THE ILLUSTRATED
AM. 421 (Jan. 21, 1891). 
98. Richard B. Kielbowicz, Speeding the News: Postal Express, 1825-1861: The 
Public Policy of Privileges for the Press, 22 SOC. SCI. J. 49, 50 (Jan. 1985) (citation
omitted). 
99. Id. at 50–51 (citation omitted). 
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markets.  Ships from Europe would sometimes dawdle along the coast while a 
courier carried market intelligence ashore.  Messengers then hurried the information 
south. It was even charged that public mail carriers were bribed or delayed while 
private messengers dashed ahead to convert their exclusive market information
into profits.100 
In response to concerns over cotton speculations, the Postmaster 
General proposed an express service between Boston, Massachusetts and 
Augusta, Georgia in 1825 that would travel at the rate of eleven miles per 
hour.101  That service “would convey information about ‘any sudden and 
important change in the price of the principal staples of our Country.’”102 
It was believed, that this service would “put a stop to the system of
speculation which has lately been so extensively practised by individuals 
of one commercial town on those of another who were not possessed of 
the same means of information.”103  Needless to say, cotton speculations
continued through other means. The Post Master tried again to forestall 
speculators between 1836 and1839 by creating a rapid horse express that
operated between New York and New Orleans.104  However, it too did not
stop traders seeking trading advantages.105 
A signal system between the New York and Philadelphia stock
exchanges using telescopes, semaphore flags, mirrors during the day and 
lanterns at night was created in the 1830s.106  The operator of that then 
high-speed communications system, William C. Briggs, a Philadelphia 
stock broker, could flash information between those two exchanges within 
minutes, allowing him to arbitrage stocks that were traded in both 
Philadelphia and New York.107  D.H. Craig was also using courier pigeons
to send information to Boston from Halifax, Nova Scotia where ships first 
landed with news from Europe.108
 100. Id. at 50 (citation omitted). 
101. Id. at 50–51 (citation omitted). 
102. Id. (footnote omitted). 
103. Id. at 50–51 (footnote omitted). 
104. Id.
 105. Pisani, supra note 7, at 21. 
106. 	 As one financial historian has noted: 
Timely information is so important to securities markets that, in the 1830s, a 
semaphore line sprang up between Wall Street and Philadelphia.  Men were 
stationed on tall buildings and hills every six or eight miles, armed with flags 
and telescopes.  The man on the top of the Merchants’ Exchange on Wall Street, 
where the Stock Exchange was then located, would signal opening prices to a
man in Jersey City across the Hudson, and the information could get to Philadelphia
in about thirty minutes. 
GORDON, supra note 79, at 79. 
107. DAVID HOCHFELDER, THE TELEGRAPH IN AMERICA, 1832-1920, at 101 (2012). 
108. MARKHAM, supra note 83, at 163; JAMES D. REID, THE TELEGRAPH IN AMERICA: 
ITS FOUNDERS, PROMOTERS, AND NOTED MEN 609 (1879). 
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A way to speed orders on Wall Street was through the use of “pad­
shovers,” who acted as messengers between brokers. They were “walking 
tickers” that would shove their messages right under the broker’s noses to
make sure they were read immediately.109 “Rushing the Pad, they used to 
call the process.”110 William Heath, the fleetest of these pad-shovers, was 
so fast that he was called the “American Deer.”111  The pad-shovers were
eventually replaced by faster communication systems, but messenger boys
continued to be “an important link in Wall Street’s flow of information.”112 
The introduction of the telegraph in 1844 changed the speed of
communications by magnitudes and soon led to its use by speculators. 
“The telegraph would have a profound impact upon the financial services 
business and helped put an entire generation of carrier pigeons out of 
work.”113  In 1846, a telegraph line between Philadelphia and New York 
also replaced Briggs’s once high-speed mirrors and flags.114  It was soon 
reported that “certain parties in New York and Philadelphia were employing 
the telegraph for speculating in stocks.”115 
The telegraph was also used to trade on advance information about Civil 
War battles, allowing speculators to profit in the gold markets in New 
York that were sensitive to such news.116  “Anson Stager, serving as both 
U.S. Military Telegraph Corps (USMT) superintendent and Western
Union superintendent, and George Ladd, Western Union’s California 
superintendent, both made fortunes leveraging their advance knowledge 
of war news to speculate in gold.”117 
This high-speed information advantage also induced “some crafty
manipulators” to profit from such information in advance of other traders.118 
“A favorite ploy was to bribe a telegraph operator or war office clerk” in 
109. EDWIN LEFEVVRE, THE MAKING OF A STOCKBROKER 160 (1924). 
110. Id.
 111. MARKHAM, supra note 83, at 245; A Shock to Wall-Street: Henry N. Smith and 
William Heath & Co. Fail. The Culmination of Dealings That Began Before Black 
Friday—A Blow From Vanderbilt’s Axe, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1885, at 1. 
112. THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 82 (James E. Buck ed., 1999). 
113. CHARLES R. GEISST, WALL STREET: A HISTORY 46 (2004). 
114. HOCHFELDER, supra note 107, at 101. 
115. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-CIT-469, ELECTRONIC BULLS AND BEARS: 
U.S. SECURITIES MARKETS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 129 (1990). 
116.  “Gold prices would ‘gyrate with each new victory or defeat for the Union
army.’” RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND
THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE 22 (1990). 
117. HOCHFELDER, supra note 107, at 104. 
118. MAURY KLEIN, THE LIFE AND LEGEND OF JAY GOULD 69 (1986). 
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order to obtain advance knowledge of military developments.119  “The  
Lees, Grants, and Shermans had their counterparts in the great stock 
operators who bribed soldiers, sutlers, politicians, and telegraph operators 
in order to get the latest information from the front.”120 
“The so-called Bogus Proclamation incident in May 1864 demonstrated 
the power of telegraphic information (even false information) to influence 
the gold market.”121  That incident involved the planting of a false claim
supposedly issued in Washington by President Lincoln and telegraphed 
late at night by the Associated Press to newspaper editors in New York. 
This bogus message stated that, because of war reverses, the President was 
announcing the draft of 400,000 additional men into the Union army.  This 
caused stock prices to plunge on Wall Street and gold prices to soar. 
Joseph Howard, city editor of the Brooklyn Eagle, carried out this scheme 
and made a large profit from the hoax. Howard was sent to jail for this 
fraud, but served less than three months.  President Lincoln granted that 
early release after announcing, only a few months after the hoax, that the 
government would actually be drafting 500,000 additional men.122 
In another trading coup, Robber Baron Jay Gould used fast ships to
trade in London on advance news that the Confederacy had capitulated.
Gould sold confederate bonds short in the London market, and those bonds
became worthless once news of the Union victory reached England.123 
“The new technology of the post-Civil War years, the perfection of the 
telegraph, telephone and ticker systems, drastically affected managing the
‘business’ of the [Chicago] board of trade” and the stock exchanges.124 
The Atlantic cable was used to send quotes after it became fully
operational in 1866. “From the stock broker’s standpoint its prime value 
was in transmitting instantaneous quotations, and orders to buy and sell
securities, between the continents.”125  As a result of that new high-speed 
communication device, “financiers such as Peabody and Morgan could 
119. Id.
 120. EDWARD CHANCELLOR, DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL
SPECULATION 160 (1999).
 121. HOCHFELDER, supra note 107, at 104. 
122. The Civil War Gold Hoax, MUSEUM HOAXES, http://www.museumofhoaxes.com/
hoax/archive/permalink/the_civil_war_gold_hoax [http://perma.cc/FP74-LYTJ] (last visited
July 28, 2015). 
123. Pisani, supra note 8, at 23. 
124. JONATHAN LURIE, THE CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, 1874-1905: THE DYNAMICS
OF SELF-REGULATION 8 (1979). 
125. EDMUND C. STEDMAN, THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 195 (1905). The 
Atlantic cable created an “arbitrage business, in which stock houses with foreign connections 
learned to profit by the price differences between the New York and London markets for 
American shares.” Id. 
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move quickly in and out of markets, easily trade in foreign currencies, and
anticipate the effects of international news.”126 
The stock ticker, which was invented in 1867, was an advance in high-
speed trading technology, which “broadcast real-time financial information 
from exchange floors to anyone subscribing to the service.”127  “Taking 
the information supplied by the trading-floor reporters, telegraph operators 
entered transaction data onto a circular push-button keyboard, activating 
the print wheels of tickers in subscriber’s offices.”128 
The telegraph remained the key to high-speed trading on Wall Street.
“Then, as now, traders believed they could make money if they knew 
about trades before their competitors did.”129 A Harpers Weekly illustration 
from 1873 shows a maze of wires “running from buildings around the 
stock exchange, with Western Union promoting ‘direct wires.’”130  One 
broker described the layers of telegraph wires used by brokers on Wall
Street and its environs as being so dense that, “[n]o bird could fly through 
their network, a man could almost walk upon them; in fact, they darkened
the street and the windows below their level.”131  This network of wires
became such a nuisance that the City of New York required them to be 
buried beneath the streets.132 
“Thomas Edison’s quadruplex, a device that allowed four messages to 
be sent simultaneously over one telegraph wire” was invented in 1874 and 
further speeded Wall Street communications.133  The invention of the
telephone was another communications advance.  In 1878, two years after 
126. JEAN STROUSE, MORGAN, AMERICAN FINANCIER 65 (1999). 
127. HOCHFELDER, supra note 107, at 102. 
128. THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 112, at 116.
 129. Floyd Norris, Sacrificing Sense for Speed in Markets, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/11/business/sacrificing-sense-for-speed-in-markets.
html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/556S-S29M]. 
130. Id.  The first edition of the Wall Street Journal that was printed on July 8, 1896
contained front-page advertisements from brokers and bankers promoting their “Direct
Wire” connections. The Wall Street Journal’s First Edition, WSJ 125, http://wsj.com/ 
125/wsj-first-edition/#/#8 [http://perma.cc/58GS-HUTZ] (last visited Aug. 3, 2015).  For
example, Spencer Trask & Co., advertised its direct wire connections among its offices in 
New York, Albany and Providence R.I. and to markets in Philadelphia, Boston, and
Chicago.  Id.
 131. HOCHFELDER, supra note 107, at 101. 
132. RUSSELL O. WRIGHT, CHRONOLOGY OF THE STOCK MARKET 19 (2002). 
133. HOCHFELDER, supra note 107, at 23; Quadruplex Telegraph, ENGINEERING & 
TECH. HIST. WIKI, http://ethw.org/Quadruplex_Telegraph [http://perma.cc/KT5V-XPNY] 
(last modified Feb. 13, 2012). 
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its invention, the NYSE installed the first telephones on its floor.134 By
1880, most brokers had telephone lines connected directly to the exchanges.135 
It was thought by some that the telegraph and telephone limited speculation 
by making important market moving information generally available.  In 
1890, however, the president of Western Union testified before Congress 
that forty six percent of that company’s “message traffic was ‘purely
speculative,’ including ‘stock-jobbing, wheat deals in futures, cotton deals 
in futures’ and horse racing odds, while only thirty four percent pertained
to what he considered ‘legitimate trade.’”136  The telegraph, in all events, 
dramatically affected development of the markets.  Some 250 exchanges 
had operated at various periods during the nineteenth century, but many
of them were put out of business as a result of the telegraph.137 
Large brokerage firms earned the sobriquet of “wire houses” by reason
of their high-speed telegraph and telephone connections with branch
offices and the exchanges.138  By 1905, a San Francisco broker was executing 
orders within five minutes of their receipt on stock and commodity
exchanges in New York and Chicago.  Another San Francisco broker had
a private wire to the Boston Copper Market.139  Jones & Baker was the
country’s largest stockbroker in 1917 and ran private wires to the homes 
of favored clients.140  As trading surged in the markets during the 1920s, 
commission brokers had in place some 500,000 miles of private wires to 
transmit customer orders and information, including over 100 private 
wires stretched between New York and Chicago.141 
In 1924, the NYSE added ticker tape enlarging machines that allowed 
the display of ticker tape information on large overhead screens on the 
floor.142  By 1925, the NYSE also installed some thirty miles of copper
pneumatic tubes to connect its specialists’ trading booths with broker 
telephone booths on the NYSE floor.  Order execution instructions from 
broker desks on the NYSE floor were placed in those pneumatic tubes by
“tube men.” In an effort that would presage efforts to slow HFT’s, “[t]he 
pneumatic tube system was constructed so that a message traveling a long 
134. WRIGHT, supra note 133, at 18. 
135. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 115, at 129. 
136. HOCHFELDER, supra note 107, at 103. 
137. MARKHAM, supra note 83, at 334. 
138. 2 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM
J.P. MORGAN TO THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (1900-1970) 8 (2002); J. Peter Ferderer, 
Advances in Communication Technology and Growth of the American Over-the-Counter 
Markets, 1876-1929, 68 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 13 (2008). 
139. MARKHAM, supra note 138, at 9.
140. Id. at 86. 
141. Id. at 129. 
142. THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 112, at 143. 
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distance would arrive at the same time as one sent by a shorter route, in 
this way not giving anyone an unfair advantage.”143 
In 1930, the NYSE introduced a new high-speed ticker that could report
trading activity at 500 characters per minute, nearly double the speed of 
prior tickers.144  Stock market quotes were then sent from the exchanges
to a Western Union office in New York and punched onto a perforated
tape by clerks. “The tape was then fed through the telex machine, which
sent out electrical impulses that became the prices on the ticker seen in 
brokerage offices around the country.”145 
Many brokers had a “board room” for customers to observe a ticker tape 
of trading activity on the NYSE.146  In the mid-1930s, there were over
9,000 tickers in the U. S. and Canada.147  Additional information shown 
on the “board” might include current information on commodity prices, 
foreign currencies, the number of shares sold each hour on the New York
Stock Exchange, and the Dow-Jones average might be posted periodically.148 
In addition, earlier in the 1930s, the industry developed a mechanism for 
projecting the ticker tape onto a screen by a trans-lux machine, which
made for easy viewing and was popular with customers.149 
B. Early Co-location Issues 
An issue of considerable concern with high-speed trading by HFTs has 
been their efforts to locate, actually “co-locate,” their computer servers in 
or near an exchange facility so that they can receive market data more
quickly and respond accordingly.150  Co-location, or other efforts to obtain 
close proximity to an exchange, reduces latency.151  Co-location seeks the
 143. Id. at 142. 
144. MARKHAM, supra note 138, at 226; RICHARD J. TEWELES & EDWARD S. BRADLEY, 
THE STOCK MARKET 149 (1998). 
145. CHARLES R. GEISST, 100 YEARS OF WALL STREET 65 (2000). 
146. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., THE SECURITY MARKETS 230 (Alfred L. 
Bernheim & Margaret Grant Schneider eds., 1935). 
147. Id. at 252. 
148. Id. at 230–31. 
149. Id. at 230, 251–52. 
150. Hearing, supra note 6.
151. 	 As the CFTC has noted: 
Two common methods for reducing latency are co-location and proximity
hosting, defined as the placement of a firm’s trading technology in close proximity
to the trading platform.  They may be offered directly by an exchange or by a
third-party service provider.  Co-location denotes those connectivity solutions 
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same time and place advantage that exchange floor members have sought 
and enjoyed over the centuries—a principal attraction for membership
zealously guarded then and now that usually comes with a steep price for
a seat on the exchange. 
The informational advantages of a central exchange and co-location 
have long been known.  In Rome, over 1,600 years ago, one “way for 
merchants to more efficiently spread information was to work physically
near each other. Knowing each other, seeing each other each day, and 
gossiping together would undoubtedly increase the information flow 
between the merchants.”152 
The so-called Buttonwood Agreement, which laid the groundwork for
the NYSE in 1792, stated that the signers would sell “Public Stock” at a 
fixed rate of commission and that members “will give preference to each
other in our Negotiations.”153  The Buttonwood Agreement effectively 
limited membership of its members to the wealthier financiers in New 
York, providing an exclusive society for stock trading at collusive rates 
of commission.  “Before long, the Buttonwood Agreement lapsed, but its 
exclusionary principle served as the foundation of the New York Stock & 
Exchange Board,” the predecessor to the NYSE.154  By 1819, the members
of that exchange reached a “mutual understanding ‘not to inform outsiders 
of the bids, offers or transactions of any particular members.’”155 The
exchange floor then became a central source of valuable information on
the most current value of stocks traded through its facilities. 
Traders on exchange floors could generate orders and respond to events 
much faster than those removed from the floor.156  Even with the development 
of the telegraph and telephone, floor traders retained a decided time and
place advantage over traders without such access.  Exchange membership 
“exclusivity allowed members to use the information obtained at the 
Board for their own advantage in trades with nonmembers.”157  This
informational advantage did not pass unnoticed by politicians.  The New 
York Senate passed a bill in 1836 that would have prohibited the NYSE
from closing its trading sessions to non-member traders, but that bill was 
hosted by the exchange itself, while proximity hosting indicates services offered 
by third parties. 
Risk Controls and System Safeguards, supra note 5, at 56,546. 
152. David Kessler & Peter Temin, The Organization of the Grain Trade in the Early 
Roman Empire, 60 ECON. HIST. REV., 313, 329 (2007). 
153. STEDMAN, supra note 126, at 36. 
154. STUART BRUCHEY, MODERNIZATION OF THE AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE 
(1971-1989) 8 (1991). 
155. STEDMAN, supra note 126, at 70. 
156. WALTER WERNER & STEVEN SMITH, WALL STREET 29 (1991). 
157. Id. 
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defeated.158  Stymied speculators on the curb market drilled a hole through 
a wall on the NYSE trading floor in 1837 in order to hear quotations.159 
That practice was stopped, but during the Civil War, brokers paid $100 to
listen through a keyhole so that they could follow stock quotations on the 
floor of the NYSE.160 
The NYSE also sought to preserve its time and place location advantage 
for floor members by restricting access to the floor by telephone and 
telegraph devices. As Henry Emery noted in 1896, private wires between
Boston and New York were in popular use.  “A change in price in either 
place was known by the broker on the floor of the other within less than 
thirty seconds. This was trade reduced to its finest point.  It is not necessary
to point out how completely such dealings bring about a uniformity of
price.”161  In 1894, however, the NYSE required communications from
the floor to the telephone to be sent by a messenger.  “This action was taken 
solely for the practical purpose of bringing the business of other centres 
to the New York market, and to more strictly maintain commission 
rates.”162  This “was a backward step from the economic point of view, and, 
on the practical side as well, the opinion is not uncommon that it diminished 
rather than increased business.”163 
Information from the trading floor proved its value in other ways.  The
NYSE and the commodity exchanges sought to gain control over their 
quotations by restricting and selling the right to receive that data through 
telegraph lines.164  That information was deemed valuable and could be
sold to traders seeking high-speed access to exchange trading data.165  The 
exchanges also recognized that they could shut down competitors by
denying access to their quotes.166  Some of those competitors were the
unsavory bucket shops that were essentially betting operations on grain
and stock prices:
 158. MARKHAM, supra note 83, at 159. 
159. Robert Steiner, The Big Board’s Bicentennial, 200 Years Later, Small Investors 
Find Clout at America’s Premier Exchange, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1992, at C1. 
160. STEDMAN, supra note 126, at 146; MARKHAM, supra note 83, at 242. 
161. Emery, supra note 2, at 139. 
162. Id.
 163. Id.
 164. HOCHFELDER, supra note 107, at 101. 
165. Id.
 166. Id. 
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As financial markets increasingly became markets in information, control of and
access to the flows of quotations became a major source of conflict between
exchanges, telegraph companies, brokers, and bucket shops.  By broadcasting
quotations to a wider and wider audience, the ticker and telegraph network
enabled the dramatic growth in stock trading and ownership in the twentieth 
century.167 
The battle with the bucket shops over exchange quotations was all about
the trading advantages of such information.  In 1905, the Supreme Court
strongly protected the exchanges’ power to sell and distribute that data 
selectively in Board of Trade v. Christie.168  There, the Court recognized 
the property right of an exchange in its trading data and the corresponding 
right to control its use.169  The Court further rejected a claim that the
information should be made freely available because it was being used by 
exchanges to encourage speculation.170 
Exchanges have thus long employed the practice of selling market
information at the highest price the market will bear.171  The Supreme 
Court did later place some limits under the antitrust laws on the
exchanges’ ability to use their market power to punish others by arbitrarily
denying access to their trading data.  In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 
the Supreme Court held that the NYSE could not order its members to
remove private direct telephone wire connections with a nonmember 
without giving the nonmember due process in the form of notice of the 
167. HOCHFELDER, supra note 107, at 102–03. 
168.  Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236 (1905). 
169. Id. at 245, 253. 
170. Id.  Justice Holmes thus stated that the Chicago Board of Trade was: 
[A] great market, where, through its eighteen hundred members, is transacted a 
large part of the grain and provision business of the world.  Of course, in a 
modern market contracts are not confined to sales for immediate delivery. 
People will endeavor to forecast the future and to make agreements according to
their prophecy.  Speculation of this kind by competent men is the self-adjustment of
society to the probable.  Its value is well known as a means of avoiding or 
mitigating catastrophes, equalizing prices and providing for periods of want. It
is true that the success of the strong induces imitation by the weak, and that 
incompetent persons bring themselves to ruin by undertaking to speculate in
their turn.  But legislatures and courts generally have recognized that the natural 
evolutions of a complex society are to be touched only with a very cautious hand, 
and that such coarse attempts at a remedy for the waste incident to every social
function as a simple prohibition and laws to stop its being are harmful and vain. 
Id. at 247–48. 
171. After the author joined the CBOE as an executive in 1974, he was given the 
unenviable task of informing the quote vendors that the exchange would no longer pay
them to publish the exchange’s price information.  Instead, the vendors would have to pay
the exchange for that data.  One vendor smashed his quote machine in front of me upon 
being informed of this change, but the firm still paid. 
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intention to sever those connections, a statement of the reasons for the 
action, and an opportunity to be heard on the matter.172 
In 1918, the NYSE prohibited specialists on its floor from disclosing 
customer stop orders to others, namely, customer orders directing the 
buying or selling of a stock when it reached a particular price.  Traders 
had been using that information to profit from those orders as market 
prices changed.173  However, information in the specialists’ book of limit
and stop orders remained available to the specialists, providing them with
“special knowledge.”174  This allowed the specialists to have “a tremendous
advantage over the general public” when trading for the specialists’ own 
account.175  The specialists claimed that this advantage was justified because
their trading provided stability and liquidity to the market and more 
efficient pricing because they were making continuous two-sided markets 
for customer orders.  The floor traders on the NYSE could make no such
claims because their training was purely opportunistic.  Those floor traders 
did not make continuous markets and tended to accentuate price trends 
and volatility.176 
IV. TWENTIETH CENTURY EXCHANGES—THE PRE-COMPUTER ERA 
A. The NYSE
The time and place advantage of floor traders on the NYSE over other 
traders was well in place when the federal securities laws were enacted to 
regulate their activities in the 1930s.  As the SEC noted, during that 
period, the exchanges operated as auction markets through a labyrinth of
brokers and specialists who provided liquidity for the stocks traded
through their facilities.  The SEC has thus noted that:
[I]n the mid-1930s, the predominant markets for the trading of securities in the 
United States were the organized stock exchanges.  Predominant among these 
were exchanges such as the NYSE and New York Curb Exchange (. . .[renamed] 
the American Stock Exchange (‘Amex’), which operated as centralized, continuous 
auction markets for the trading of listed securities.  Those auction markets offered
liquidity, continuity, and depth to investors through the services of several categories
of member brokers and dealers: (1) commission brokers (who traded primarily
for the accounts of public customers); (2) floor brokers (who traded primarily for
581 
172.  Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 365 (1963). 
173.  MARKHAM, supra note 138, at 86. 
174.  S. REP. NO. 1455 at 25 (2d Sess. 1934). 
175.  Id.
176.  MARKHAM, supra note 138, at 125. 





    










   
   
 
 
   










the accounts of other exchange members); (3) floor traders (who traded primarily
for their own accounts); and, most importantly, (4) ‘specialists.’  Exchange specialists, 
trading issues assigned to them at particular floor locations called ‘posts’, 
performed the dual functions of effecting transactions in securities allocated to
them both for their own accounts (as dealers) and for the accounts of others (as
brokers). As dealers, the specialists assumed “affirmative” obligations to trade 
for their own accounts in order to maintain market continuity and depth, and were 
subject to statutorily imposed “negative” obligations to abstain from trading for
their own accounts unless such trading was necessary for the maintenance of a fair
and orderly market.  As brokers, the specialists were required to execute not only 
market orders (to buy or sell at the best current market price), but also limit orders
(orders to buy or sell at a specific price or better) and “stop” orders (orders
requiring the specialist to execute the order when a transaction in the security
occurs at or above the ‘stop’ price in the order).177 
The process for executing a customer order was a laborious one that 
involved transmitting the order by wire or telephone and then to a floor 
broker for manual execution at a specialist’s post.178  Floor traders on these
exchanges still had a decided time and place advantage that gave them an 
edge over “outside operators,” namely, traders entering orders from 
outside the exchange, who also had to pay higher commission rates than 
exchange members.179  Criticism of NYSE floor traders led that exchange
to prohibit them from trading for their own account unless their bid or 
offer was at least one eighth of a dollar better than customer orders.180 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (34 Act) imposed statutory duties 
of self-regulation on the exchanges. This required the exchanges to 
enforce their rules against members through disciplinary actions.181 The
177. SEC, Self-Regulatory Organizations; Delta Government Options Corp.; Order
Granting Temporary Registration as a Clearing Agency, Exchange Act Release No. 34­
27611, 55 Fed. Reg. 1890, 1895–96 (1990) (footnotes omitted). 
178. 	  The SEC observed that: 
The exchanges of the 1930s were designed, through the interaction of specialists 
and floor brokers, to accommodate trading by retail investors as well as 
institutions.  Typically, a customer’s market order, placed initially with a branch
office of a member firm, would be routed by telephone or wire to the trading
floor of the broker’s firm, usually in New York City; there, it would be taken by
a floor broker. The floor broker would then carry the order to the specialist’s 
post, where the floor broker would either: (1) Match the order against a reciprocal 
order represented in the crowd or left with the specialists, to be recorded in the 
specialist’s “book.”  When buy and sell orders could not matched, the specialists 
would function as dealer, buying or selling a sufficient amount of stocks to 
ensure a continuous, orderly market. 
Id. at 1896.
 179. MARKHAM, supra note 138, at 4.
 180. Id. at 60. 
181. 	  As one court noted: 
As national securities exchanges, the intervenors are self-regulatory organizations
(SROs).They therefore “have ‘a duty to promulgate and enforce rules governing
the conduct of [their] members,’ under the oversight of the SEC.”  Exchanges 
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34 Act directed the SEC to consider the complete separation of the roles 
of “brokers” who execute orders for customers and “dealers” that trade 
for their own account as principal with their customers.182 
The SEC’s report on that issue focused on the roles of the specialists 
and floor traders on the stock exchanges.  The SEC noted the time and 
place advantage of floor traders and specialists, which was especially
valuable when the NYSE ticker tape was running late because of heavy
trading in volatile markets.183  A late tape was not uncommon on heavy 
trading volume days.  The NYSE even had a “Ticker Tape Delay” indicator 
that showed how long the tape was running behind the reporting of 
trades.184 
must file their rules with the SEC and ensure compliance therewith. Section 6 of
the Exchange Act requires that the rules of national securities exchanges, inter alia, 
“provide for the equitable allocation of reasonable dues, fees, and other charges 
among its members and issuers and other persons using its facilities”; “promote 
just and equitable principles of trade”; and do not “permit unfair discrimination 
between customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers” or “impose any burden on 
competition that is not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes 
of” the Exchange Act. 
NetCoalition v. SEC, 715 F.3d 342, 344–45 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). 
182. SEC. &  EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY AND ADVISABILITY OF THE
COMPLETE SEGREGATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF DEALER AND BROKER, at xiii (1936).  The 
SEC defined the role of a broker as someone who is acting as an agent of his customer in 
the purchase or sale of
securities:
He does not undertake to sell to or buy from his customer but rather to negotiate 
a contract of purchase or sale between the customer and a third party.  The 
transaction is solely for the account of the customer who becomes the owner of 
securities purchased by the broker on his behalf, is entitled to the profits realized 
and is liable for the losses incurred.  The broker has no beneficial interest in the 
transaction except the commission or other remuneration which he receives for 
his services. 
Id. at xiv.  The SEC defined the role of a dealer as being:
[S]imilar to those of a dealer or jobber in merchandise.  The dealer sells securities to
his customer which he has purchased or intends to purchase elsewhere or buys
securities from his customer with a view to disposing of them elsewhere.  In any 
such transaction he acts for his own account and not as agent for the customer. 
He receives no brokerage commission but relies for his compensation upon a 
favorable difference or spread between the price at which he buys and the 
amount for which he sells. The risk of loss is entirely his own. 
Id.
 183. MARKHAM, supra note 138, at 209. 
184. THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 112, at 161. 
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The SEC’s report was critical of the role of floor traders because they 
had no obligation to maintain a fair and orderly market.185  However, it 
was not until the 1960s that the SEC effectively excluded such traders 
from exchange floors.186  Even then, the specialists continued to enjoy 
their time and place advantage. To be sure, that advantage was tempered
by a requirement that they maintain a continuous two-sided “fair and
orderly” market.187  This required specialists to quote a “spread” between 
the price at which what it was willing to sell shares and the price at which 
it stood ready to buy share.188  This was no penalty, however, because the
specialist captured the “spread” as a profit.189  All things being equal, the
specialist would profit on the difference in prices between his buy and sell
orders.190  This advantage of the specialist was thought justifiable because 
the presence of the specialist gave assurance of liquidity for investors 
seeking to buy and sell NYSE listed securities.191 
NYSE rules continued to seek to protect the specialists’ monopoly over 
NYSE listed stocks.192  Since 1863, the NYSE prohibited its members
from dealing in NYSE listed stocks outside the exchange’s floor.193  The
SEC, however, acted to stop the NYSE from enforcing that restriction 
where its stocks traded on regional exchanges.194 In 1940, there were
seventeen such exchanges, but their volume was comparatively small, and 
the NYSE’s restriction, found in NYSE Rule 390, on off-exchange trading 
continued to apply to the larger OTC market.195
 185. MARKHAM, supra note 138, at 209. 
186.  17 C.F.R. § 240.11a-1 (2014). 
187. Id.
 188. Andy Kessler, High-Frequency Trading Needs One Quick Fix, WALL ST. J., 
June 16, 2004, at A15. 
189. Id.
 190. Id. 
191. 	  That advantage was also subject to criticism.  As one commentator has noted: 
Being a New York Stock Exchange specialist—each stock had one—was a 
lucrative business because there is information in every trade.  Like Nasdaq 
market makers, they didn’t charge commissions but instead would keep the
spread, or the difference between the bid and the ask price, measured in quarters 
(25 cents) and eighths (12.5 cents).  And specialists were notorious for front 
running customers. Simply put, if they didn’t like the spread on a buy order, 
they would buy shares themselves and then raise the price of the shares they had 
to offer, knowing there was a buyer in the market.  At a cocktail party many
years ago, I asked a specialist about this and he told me, ‘You big investment 
banking guys shouldn’t worry about it, we need to get paid too.’
Id.
 192. MARKHAM, supra note 138, at 244. 
193. Id.
 194. Id.
 195. MARKHAM, supra note 138, at 244. 
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Rule 390 posed a serious problem for the execution of large institutional 
orders because the specialists did not have sufficient capital to execute 
large block trades at a competitive price.196  This was important because
trading in the stock markets was being driven, beginning in the 1950s, by
institutional traders, rather than by retail traders who had historically
driven trading volumes.197 
The growth of institutional size orders caused substantial conflict between 
the exchanges and those institutions.  The NYSE wanted to milk those 
orders by requiring the institutions to pay the specialists’ spreads, and the
NYSE required those institutions to pay a large commission to the NYSE 
member firm executing their trades.  The institutions wanted neither to 
pay the spread nor the commission. The institutions were particularly
galled that their large block trades, which required the same paperwork as 
a small order, were forced to pay a commission magnitudes greater than
small trades.198 
The lack of capital on the part of specialists to execute large block 
orders led, in the 1950s, to block trading arrangements in which broker-
dealers, like Goldman Sachs, assembled large institutional trades “upstairs” 
and then reported them to the NYSE floor for execution.199  Broker-
dealers arranged block trades upstairs by contacting known active and
 196. See  LISA ENDLICH, GOLDMAN SACHS: THE CULTURE OF SUCCESS 66 (1999)
(describing this inability). 
197. 	  As one source notes: 
[I]n the 1950s, the stockbrokers’ world began to change.  The profile of the “typical”
investor was changing, from the moderately affluent individual investor occasionally
buying or selling a few shares through his retail stockbroker to the continuously
active, professional institutional investor who was active in the market all the 
time, buying and selling positions in dozens of different stocks everyday.
CHARLES D. ELLIS, THE PARTNERSHIP: THE MAKING OF GOLDMAN SACHS 135 (2008). This
growth of institutional trading led to an extensive five-volume study by the Commission 
in 1973 on the identity of institutional traders and their role in the marketplace. 1–5 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
H.R. DOC. NO. 92-64, pt. 6 (1st Sess. 1971).  The Institutional Investor Study was conducted
pursuant to a joint resolution of Congress, which directed the SEC to determine the effect 
of institutional trading “upon . . . the maintenance of fair and orderly securities markets . . . 
the stability of such markets . . . the interest of the issuers . . . and upon the interests of the 
public . . . .” S. JOURNAL, 90th Cong., 82 Stat. 453 (1968). 
198. This was an enormous expense for active institutional traders.  For example, the 
commission on a 100,000-share transaction was 1,000 times higher than the commission
on a 100-share transaction even though the costs of executing larger trades were not nearly
as disproportionate.  Utilization of Membership on National Securities Exchanges for
Public Purposes, 38 Fed. Reg. 3902, 3915 (Feb. 8, 1973). 
199. ELLIS, supra note 197, at 134–35. 
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wealthy traders and institutional traders, such as pension funds, endowments
and other trusts, and insurance companies.  The arranging broker-dealer
exposed the order in whole or in part to other institutional clients and 
solicited those traders to take all or a portion of the block.  Through this
process, the broker-dealer was able to obtain a better price on the block 
than would be available if the block were simply dumped on the NYSE 
floor.200  This provided some relief to those institutional traders, but they
were still suffering from the requirement that they pay retail commission 
rates on their trades until the SEC began the process of eliminating that 
restriction in the 1970s. 
Before lifting that restriction, the SEC sought to block institutional
traders from becoming registered as broker-dealers.  Before fixed commissions
were eliminated in the 1970s, many actively trading institutions had 
sought to register with the SEC as broker-dealers in order to become
members of the stock exchanges.  Such membership would have allowed 
those institutions to avoid the exchanges’ fixed minimum commissions 
that exchange members’ firms were required to charge to their non­
member customers, no matter what the size of their trades.201  The NYSE 
sought to block that effort,202 with the aid of the SEC, which was concerned 
that large institutional traders might come to dominate the markets if they
were allowed to register as broker-dealers and become exchange members.203
 200. ELLIS, supra note 197, at 135–37. By 1986, institutional block sales constituted 
almost fifty percent of volume on the New York Stock Exchange, up from fifteen percent 
in 1970.  Report of the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms II-16 (1988). 
Although NYSE Rule 390 has since been repealed, block trading continues.  In 2012, 
monthly block trading volume on the NYSE was usually over $120 billion and was 
exceeding $140 billion per month in 2013. See Factbook: NYSE Group Block Volume in 
NYSE Listed, NYXDATA.COM,  http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer_ 
edition.asp?mode=table&key=3140&category=3 [http://perma.cc/J4DG-E8JT] (last visited
Sept. 12, 2015). 
201. The Commission banned exchange fixed commission schedules on May 1,
1975. See 3 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE AGE OF
DERIVATIVES TO THE NEW MILLENNIUM (1970-2001) 29–30 (2002) (describing these 
developments).
 202. See S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 60–61 (1st Sess. 1975) (describing that resistance). 
203. The SEC, therefore, allowed institutional traders to become broker-dealers only
if eighty percent of their trading was with the public, which effectively blocked most
institutional traders from becoming broker-dealer members.  See Cliff Fridkis & Willam 
J. Hunter, Securities and Exchange Commission: Coping With Institutional Membership 
and Anticompetitive Practices, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 841, 858–59 (1973) (discussing 
this controversy).  Legislation enacted in 1975 also prohibited money managers from 
creating affiliated broker-dealers in order to qualify as an exchange member unless they
did most of their business with the public.  See  MARKHAM, supra note 138, at 359
(describing that controversy).  Congress was concerned with conflicts of interests between
institutions that combine the role of an unregistered customer and that of a broker.  As 
stated in a 1975 Senate report: 
586 

















     











[VOL. 52:  555, 2015] High-Speed Trading 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
In the meantime, NYSE Rule 390 gave rise to the so-called “third” and 
“fourth” markets in NYSE listed stocks.204  The third market involved 
transactions in NYSE stock executed for institutional customers by
broker-dealers that were not NYSE members and, therefore, not subject 
to the requirements of Rule 390 or exchange minimum commissions.205 
The fourth market involved transactions between two institutional 
investors directly, without exchange or broker-dealer intermediation, and 
it was these systems that led to the development of electronic communications 
networks that match customer orders.206  In 1969, the Institutional
Network Corporation sought to develop an electronic network that would 
allow institutions to trade large blocks of stock.207  This was significant 
because the institutions were doing almost fifty percent of the stock 
Until very recently . . . fixed commission rates have provided artificial
incentives for the combination of money management and brokerage. This
combination could distort the natural evolution of the markets.  Where functions are
separated, institutions are customers for securities market services.  As such, they
will seek the most efficient and flexible market relationships, and thus help to
sharpen price and service competition in the securities business.  If the institutional 
money managers are also the brokers, however, they will lose a good deal of
their incentive to bargain with the brokers on behalf of their beneficiaries, thus 
sacrificing an important instrument of protection for the millions of Americans
whose securities investments are made through the medium of institutions. 
S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 62–65.  Institutions already holding regional exchange memberships 
were allowed to keep them for a period of three years.  “But it would be inappropriate and 
inconsistent with the Congressional purposes, for an institution to acquire an exchange 
membership during this period solely for the purpose of using that membership to effect 
transactions for its own account.”  H.R. REP. NO. 94-229, at 107 (1st Sess. 1975). 
204. The first market is a reference to the distribution of shares to the public under
the Securities Act of 1933 and the second (secondary) market is the exchanges, NASDAQ,
and now other trading centers where already issued shares are traded. 
205. 	  As one standard text book has noted: 
The third market is a market for large blocks of listed shares that operates 
outside the confines of the organized exchanges.  In the third market, blocks of 
stock (units of 10,000 shares) are traded OTC.  The participants in the third
market are large institutions (such as mutual funds, insurance companies, and 
pension funds) that often need to trade large blocks of shares.  Brokers assist the 
institutions in the third market by bringing buyers and sellers together and, in 
return, receive a fee. 
RONALD W. MELICHER & EDGAR A. NORTON, INTRODUCTION TO FINANCE 298 (2011). 
206. In the fourth market, “[c]ertain large institutional investors arrange purchases 
and sales of securities among themselves without the benefit of a broker or dealer.”  Id.
 207. SID MITTRA, INSIDE WALL STREET 224 (1971). 
 587 













   
 
 










business at that time and were excluded from membership on the
NYSE.208 
The NYSE and other stock exchanges otherwise traded pretty much in 
the same manner as they did in the nineteenth century, but with some
marginal increases in communications technology.  For example, the speed
of the ticker increased in the 1960s to 900 characters per minute.209  The
NYSE also experimented with “optical reader cards” that were filled out
by reporters at the trading posts on the floor that could be read by a 
computer and transmitted over the ticker.210 
By the 1960s, the NYSE Quotation Department also supplied quotes to 
telephone callers by voice recordings. “Quote boys” phoned in the bid 
and asked quotes for some 300 stocks.  The voice recording was then played 
back to subscribers to the service, which they could access by dialing a 
three-digit code. At any one time, up to thirty-seven subscribers could 
access the recorded quote for any one stock.211  By 1966, the American 
Stock Exchange was using computers to input trading information from 
the floor into its ticker system.212 
Technology had not added much to order execution times on the
exchanges, and trading remained a cumbersome process in the 1960s. 
Orders were phoned or sent by teletype to the floor operations of a broker-
dealer, which sent them to a floor broker—by hand signal, pneumatic tube 
or mechanical conveyor belt—who then conveyed the order to the specialist 
for execution or placement in the specialist’s book of limit orders.  The 
process repeated to confirm the order on execution.  As a SEC study of 
the securities markets noted in 1963:
In spite of its importance, the floor of the NYSE has been untouched by most of 
the technological developments of the 20th century.  A critic of the NYSE’s
progress in technological innovation has said that the basic organization of the 
Exchange’s floor has not changed since the ‘period in which the institution
solidified—slightly before the telephone.’ While the Special Study should not be
understood as espousing the proposals made by this commentator, there is
undoubtedly some merit in his analysis.  Aside from recent developments in
methods of transmitting orders to the floor . . .  and various innovations and proposed
innovations with respect to the reporting of transactions . . . there has been no
 208. See id.  It was noted in 1992 “[T]raders are shifting waves of business in NYSE 
listed securities to the Fourth Market, in which large institutional investors trade directly
among themselves in informal groups, and to foreign exchanges, most of which are 
completely automated.”  Dale Arthur Oesterle et al., The New York Stock Exchange and 
Its Out Moded Specialist System: Can the Exchange Innovate To Survive?, 17 J. CORP. L.  
223, 227–28 (1992). 
209. MITTRA, supra note 207, at 22; THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 
112, at 192. 
210. THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 112, at 192. 
211. Id. at 185. 
212. BRUCHEY, supra note 154, at 41. 
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basic change in the methods of executing orders since the NYSE floor took its
present form. Except for firms utilizing teletype devices, orders reach the 
Exchange by telephone and are written down on slips by clerks.  From that point, 
orders are transmitted manually by brokers, or through tubes, to-the trading post. 
Orders given to specialists are again transcribed by hand onto the specialists’ 
books. At present there is no internal means of assuring that quotations
announced on the floor of the Exchange are the same as those disseminated to the 
public.  Even after the Exchange automates its off-floor quotation service such
assurance will not be provided.213 
The NYSE faced a near total collapse at the end of the 1960s, when 
increased trading volumes resulted in a “paperwork crisis.”214  NYSE  
members were unable to deal with the avalanche of documents required 
to document and clear this increased trading volume.215  Between 1968 
213. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES OF
BROKERS AND DEALERS, H.R. DOC. NO. 231, at 323 (2d Sess. 1971) (footnotes omitted). 
The order execution process on the American Stock Exchange in the early 1960s was 
described as follows: 
The member firm’s booth clerk receives a sell order either from the firm’s order 
room or branch office via telephone or teletype. The clerk relays the customer’s 
limit order . . .  from the booth to the floor broker.  To do so he uses a hand signal 
or writes the order . . . on an order slip and places it on a conveyor belt that 
carries it to the edge of the trading floor. The floor broker acknowledges the 
order and walks to the post where [the stock] is traded and hands it to the 
specialist.  The specialist stamps the order with date and time and files it in the 
trading post rack until ready for execution.  He executes the order when the 
market price . . . [reaches the limit order price] and records the volume, price, 
and clearing name . . . of the contra broker on the order slip. (If the specialist 
executes the order for his own account he enters the sale and his trading book). 
The specialist’s clerk then reports the execution of the order to the member firm 
booth clerk via a pneumatic tube system.  And in the meantime the data clerk at 
the trading post has checked the accuracy of the stock symbol and sales price on
the sales slip.  The sale is then entered into a key set, the data clerk verifies entry,
and the sale . . . appears on the ticker.
BRUCHEY, supra note 154, at 40. 
214. See SEC. &  EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 213 (describing that crisis and its causes). 
215. 	 As the SEC later found: 
The operations crisis in the securities industry first reached major dimensions in
August of 1967. Newspaper reports of that period recall the feverish efforts of
the Wall Street community to keep up with each day’s business: Stock
certificates and related documents were piled ‘halfway to the ceiling’ in some 
offices; clerical personnel were working overtime, six and seven days a week, 
with some firms using a second or even a third shift to process each day’s
transactions. Hours of trading on the exchanges and over the counter were 
curtailed to give back offices additional time after the closing bell.  Deliveries 
to customers and similar activities dropped seriously behind, and the number of 
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and 1970, over 100 NYSE firms failed, including several large ones, as a 
result of their inability to document customer trades properly and in a 
timely manner.  This crisis resulted in an industry wide effort to computerize 
and streamline clearing and settlement practices and paperwork. As a 
result, by the turn of this century, the stock markets could execute and 
clear trading volumes in the billions of shares, whereas before it had choked 
on average trading volumes of 16 million shares per day.216 
The floor trading operations of the exchanges were also subject to
abuse. Two specialists on the floor of the Amex were found to have been 
engaged in the sale of unregistered securities and a massive stock price 
manipulation scheme.217  A series of scandals erupted on the NYSE in this
century, as trading there was migrating to electronic trading platforms.
The Justice Department brought criminal charges against various specialists 
for “interpositioning” their trades between customer orders.  However, 
those prosecutions failed. The SEC did obtain settlements from specialist
firms totaling some $240 million, over charges that those firms were 
trading ahead of customer orders and for taking orders into their own accounts 
that could have been matched against other customer orders.  Another 
SEC settlement involved fourteen specialists on other exchanges that were 
alleged to trading ahead of customer orders.218 
B. The OTC and Nasdaq Market
The over-the-counter (OTC) market traces its origins to the curb market 
that began in the nineteenth century.  In the OTC, or “curb” market as it 
was initially called, trading took place in the streets of New York.  Brokers 
used messengers to send hand signals from their offices to the curb traders 
in order to expedite orders. “Fingers were used to spell out the identity of
the security and the number of shares to be purchased or sold.  To make it
easier for a clerk to pick out his broker in the milling crowd below each 
broker wore some distinctive article of clothing—a colorful jacket or an 
unusual hat.”219  However, the curb traders moved their operations indoors
errors in brokers’ records, as well as the time required to trace and correct these 
errors, exacerbated the crisis. 
Id.
 216. See JERRY W. MARKHAM & THOMAS L. HAZEN, 23A  BROKER-DEALER OPERATIONS
AND REGULATION UNDER SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES LAW, § 13:3 (2013) (describing
those improvements). 
217. ROBERT SOBEL, AMEX: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE
(1921-1971) 260–66 (1972). 
218. See JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM
ENRON-ERA SCANDALS TO THE SUBPRIME CRISIS (2004-2009) 143–44 (2011) (describing 
those scandals). 
219. BRUCHEY, supra note 154, at 17. 
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in 1921 to the Curb Exchange that later became the American Stock
Exchange.220 
Nevertheless, a network of brokers continued to operate an informal, 
but significant, OTC market.  This market became more formalized with
the founding of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., (now
FINRA), which became formally recognized as an industry self-
regulatory body by the after passage of legislation in 1938 authorizing that 
role under the federal securities laws.221 
Rather than employing a specialist’s post on an exchange floor, OTC 
trading was conducted by telephone and telegraph during much of the 
twentieth century.222  By the 1930s, some OTC broker-dealers specialized 
in particular OTC securities and, like a specialist, provided “broad and
continuous” markets in those securities.223  Quotations for OTC securities
were published in the “pink sheets” starting in 1911, so named because 
the quotations were printed on pink paper.224 The quotes in the pink sheets
were not firm.  They were merely a “guide” as to what the securities could 
have been bought or sold for at the time the quotes were compiled.225 This
meant that a broker posting quotations in the pink sheets had to be 
contacted by telephone.  A firm order price could then be negotiated that 
might vary from the quote in the pink sheets based on order size or 
changes in market conditions. 
In 1963, the SEC completed a massive study of the securities markets.226 
Among other things, it found abuses by brokers using the pink sheets to
 220. See SOBEL, supra note 217, at 1–2, 21. 
221. See MARK INGEBRETSEN, NASDAQ 41–43 (2002) (describing this history). 
222. THE SECURITY MARKETS: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF A SPECIAL 
STAFF OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND 265–66 (Alfred L. Bernheim & Margaret Grant 
eds., 1935). 
223. Id. at 265. 
224. MARKHAM, supra note 138, at 60. 
225. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, at 635 (1st Sess.
1963). 
226. 	  The SEC Special Study described the OTC market as follows: 
Transactions in securities outside the organized securities exchanges are 
described as taking place in the over-the-counter market.  The over-the-counter 
market is actually a group of markets, in which broker-dealers transact business 
with the public as principals or agents, dealing for the most part in securities not
listed on any exchanges.  Some dealers may maintain inventories in one or more 
over-the-counter securities and be willing to both buy and sell them to other 
broker-dealers, in which case they are known as “market makers” in those securities. 
Id. at 13. 
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engage in manipulative activity.  The SEC’s Special Study suggested 
using computers to report broker-dealer OTC stock quotations.227  The  
suggestion in the Special Study gave rise to the creation of the Nasdaq 
market in 1968.228  That market allowed broker-dealer quotes to be posted 
on a computer network that could be accessed by other broker-dealers,
and it allowed more rapid updating of quotes.  Still, orders had to be 
negotiated orally over the telephone.229 
Unlike the specialists on the NYSE, Nasdaq market makers competed
with each other for stocks traded on Nasdaq.230  Multiple market makers 
might compete with each other for a single Nasdaq stock.231  The Nasdaq 
market makers, nevertheless, had market making obligations that required
them to quote a continuous two-sided market that was fair and orderly.232 
This meant, however, that customers had to pay the spread between the 
bid and ask prices of those market makers, plus a brokerage commission 
or a mark up or mark down when the broker-dealer was selling for its own
account.233 
C. The Futures Markets 
The futures markets are regulated separately from the securities markets 
and by an independent regulator, the Commodity Futures Trading 
227. The Special Study stated that:
Apart from the possible utilization of a computer for the crossing of orders, the 
information supplied by a computer system could be expected to confer important
benefits on broker-dealers and on the public.  It would permit the immediate 
identification of the highest bid and lowest offer, and thus facilitate the task of a 
broker-dealer in obtaining the best market for his customer. Another advantage 
would be the compilation of complete data relating to quotations and transactions, so
that actual price and volume data could be made public as in the case of listed
securities, thus improving the ability of investors, lending institutions, and other 
interested persons to evaluate over-the-counter securities and markets.  The data
could also be speedily and comprehensively retrieved for surveillance or study
purposes by the Commission and other regulatory bodies to which access would
be granted.
Id.
 228. MARKHAM, supra note 138, at 347. Nasdaq is an acronym for National Association 
of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation system. INGEBRETSEN, supra note 221, at 18. 
229. MARKHAM, supra note 138, at 247. The pink sheets continued to publish quotes 
for stocks not actively traded or quoted on Nasdaq. MARKHAM, supra note 201, at 18. 
230. What’s the Difference Between a Nasdaq Market Maker and a NYSE Specialist?, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/128.asp [http://perma.cc/2QPS­
MMEG] (last visited Sept. 12,  2015). 
231. Id.
 232. Id.
 233. See Certain Market Making Activities on Nasdaq, Exchange Act Release No. 
34-40900, 1998 WL 919673 (Jan. 11, 1999) (describing role of Nasdaq market makers). 
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Commission (CFTC).234  The futures markets historically operated as a
public open outcry market carried out on commodity exchange floors.235 
However, those floor operations varied materially from those on the
securities markets, and no OTC trading was allowed for futures.236 
Starting in the nineteenth century and still in practice today for non-
electronic executions, orders to the floor of a commodity futures exchange 
were transmitted to an order desk operated by a futures commission merchant
(FCM) on the floor.237  The order was then taken manually to the pit by a
runner, or the order might be flashed by the runner through hand signals 
to a floor broker located in the trading pit.238  The floor broker would then
execute the order by public outcry in the pit against other customer orders 
represented by floor brokers or with floor traders trading for their own
accounts.239  The floor traders had the time and place advantages of the
specialists on the stock exchanges but had no obligation to maintain fair 
and orderly or continuous market.240 
The execution of customer orders in commodity futures trading pits 
were often chaotic in actively traded contracts during volatile markets.
“Trade throughs” of customer limit orders were common in “fast” markets 
because floor brokers could not react in time to sharp market movements.
The popular movie Trading Places that was released in 1983 paints a 
realistic picture of some of the more active pits. 
The commodity futures exchanges were regulated by the Commodity
Exchange Act of 1936.241 
234. That regulation is carried out under the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, 7
U.S.C. §§ 1–9097 (2012). 
235. See JERRY W. MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND
ITS REGULATION 40 (1986). 
236. Open Outcry, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_outcry#cite_note­
hand-signals-2 [https://perma.cc/V7Q7-3JEN] (last modified May 25, 2015). 
237. Futures Commission Merchant (FCM), NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, https://www. 
nfa.futures.org/nfa-registration/fcm/index.HTML [https://perma.cc/T64P-M9FU] (last visited
Sept. 12, 2015). 
238. How Open Outcry Works in American Futures Trading, FOR DUMMIES, http:// 
www.dummies.com/how-to/content/how-open-outcry-works-in-american-futures-trading.
html [http://perma.cc/UFN6-WPZS] (last visited Sept. 12, 2015). 
239. Id.
 240. See MARKHAM, supra note 235, at 51 (describing the development and trading 
on the futures exchanges). 
241.  7 U.S.C. §§ 1–9097 (2012). 
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D. The CBOE 
Another model of the open outcry exchange was the Chicago Board
Options Exchange, Inc. (CBOE), which had elements of both a stock and 
a commodity futures exchange.  The CBOE, which was created in 1973, 
used a futures style trading pit for trading in its standardized option 
contracts. Floor brokers held and executed customer market orders, but
customer limit orders were held and executed through a separate book 
managed by a “board broker.”  The board broker was initially an exchange 
member but later was replaced by exchange employees. The effect of this
arrangement was to separate the role of a specialist from the book of limit 
orders.242 
Market making functions on the CBOE were carried out by floor traders 
trading for their own accounts.243  However, unlike the floor traders on 
commodity futures exchanges, but like market makers and specialists in
the stock markets, CBOE floor traders had affirmative obligations to trade 
for their own accounts in order to maintain a continuous and orderly two-
sided market.244  The stock exchanges attempted to compete with the
CBOE using those exchanges’ traditional specialists as market makers.245 
However, the CBOE dominated options trading until the advent of electronic 
trading. 
V. AUTOMATION ARRIVES 
A. Introduction 
Automation began arriving on the stock exchanges in the 1970s in the 
form of automated executions for small traders.  The NYSE implemented 
a Designated Order Turnaround (DOT) system in 1976—and in 1984, the 
Super DOT system—that provided for the automated execution of small 
customer orders, namely, orders of 2,000 shares or less, at the bid and ask 
prices posted by the specialist.246  This advanced the speed execution of 
those customer orders, but the specialist was still compensated by the 
spread between those bid and ask prices.247
 242. See Jerry W. Markham & David J. Gilberg, Stock and Commodity Options –
Two Regulatory Approaches and Their Conflicts, 47 ALB. L. REV. 741, 744–45 (1983) 
(describing this process). 
243. See id. at 745. 
244. Id.
 245. Id. at 746. 
246. Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom the Bell Tolls: The Demise of
Exchange Trading Floors and the Growth of ECNs, 33 IOWA J. CORP. L. 865, 897 (2008). 
247. See MARKHAM, supra note 201, at 102–03. 
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In 1978, the SEC authorized the Cincinnati Stock Exchange to operate 
an electronic trading system in which agency and principal limit orders 
would be matched by computer.  However, it had a very low volume 
exchange with only limited participation by a few large broker-dealers.248 
However, other traders were discovering that the computer could be used
as a tool for trading.  The advent of algorithmic trading brought numerous 
active traders into the markets.  For example, so-called “program trading” 
appeared in the 1970s, which employed computer software programs to 
generate automated orders through algorithms cued to react to market
events.249  “Index arbitrage” traders also appeared.  These were traders
who tried to take advantage of small differences in the prices between a 
basket of stocks traded on NYSE and a parallel commodity futures index 
covering that basket.250 
In response to program trading and arbitrage trading of index products, 
NYSE specialists began to offer “baskets” of securities that allowed
institutional investors to trade all 500 stocks in the Standard & Poor’s 
Index in a single trade of a minimum of $5 million.  Customized baskets 
of fewer stocks were also permitted.251 This allowed program traders and 
Index arbitrage traders to hedge and trade positions in both the derivative 
and equity markets. 
Concern arose that these computer driven traders were adding volatility 
to the market.252  Critics also warned that a “cascade” scenario could result 
from algorithmic trades that would automatically generate sell orders in a 
declining market and push prices lower, thereby generating more sell
orders and so on until the market crashed.253  Those concerns seemed to 
have been justified by the Stock Market Crash of 1987, which witnessed
 248. BRUCHEY, supra note 154, at 63. One of the leaders in that experiment was 
Bernie Madoff, who later became the world’s largest crook through a massive Ponzi 
scheme that was exposed in the market downturn during the Financial Crisis in 2008.  See 
DIANA B. HENRIQUES, THE WIZARD OF LIES: BERNIE MADOFF AND THE DEATH OF TRUST 68 
(2011) (describing that involvement). 
249. See Jerry W. Markham & Rita McCloy Stephanz, The Stock Market Crash of 
1987––The United States Looks at New Recommendations, 76 GEO. L. J. 1993, 2000 
(1988) (describing program trading). 
250. Id. at 2001. 
251. William Power, Big Board To Launch ‘Basket’ Trades Today, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
26, 1989, at C1. 
252. SENIOR SUPERVISORS GRP., ALGORITHMIC TRADING BRIEFING NOTE (2015),
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/banking/2015/SSG-algorithmic-trading­
2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/367C-USG4].
 253. See Markham & Stephanz, supra note 249, at 2001 (describing those studies). 
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a stock market decline in excess of the crash in 1929.  NYSE stocks lost 
$1 trillion in value during the 1987 crash and the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average dropped 508 points on a single day.254  Studies by the SEC, the 
CFTC and others of the Stock Market Crash of 1987 concluded that
computerized trading had played a large role in adding volatility to the 
market.255  A Presidential Commission also studied the trading of those 
institutional traders and suggested reforms, hardly any of which were 
implemented.256  Instead, the markets quickly recovered and computer
trading became an accepted part of trading in both the futures and stock 
markets.
The causes of the Stock Market Crash of 1987 were much debated, but
the inability of the NYSE and Nasdaq markets to handle the execution of 
large volumes of orders in a volatile market was disturbingly clear.  A 
report by the Government Accounting Office found that thousands of 
customers had complained about the October crash and that most of those 
complaints related to difficulties in trade executions. An investor hotline 
received some 6,700 calls from investors who lost $450 million in the 
market, an average of $172,000 per caller.257  It was also determined that 
specialists on the NYSE had been unable to cope with the trading volumes 
during the October 1987 crisis and that many Nasdaq market makers had
fled from the market, abandoning their market making obligations in the 
258process.
Like the NYSE, Nasdaq developed an automated “Small Order Execution 
System” (SOES) that executed smaller orders automatically at bid and ask
prices set by Nasdaq market makers.259 That SOES system became a
target of the so-called “SOES Bandits” who traded for their own account 
and used computerized access to the SOES to take advantage of the failure
by Nasdaq market makers to keep their electronic quotes updated to reflect
current events.260  The SOES bandits traded often and broker-dealers gave
them office space as well as training programs on how to trade frequently
and at high speed.261  The NASDAQ market makers responded to those 
attacks by widening their spreads and engaging in prohibited collusive 
254. PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MKT. MECHANISMS, 88-32-P, REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS 1 (1988). 
255. See Markham & Stephanz, supra note 249, at 1993–2043 (describing those 
studies).
 256. PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS, supra note 254, at 2.
 257. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-88-38, FINANCIAL MARKETS: 
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE OCTOBER 1987 CRASH 50 (1987). 
258. MARKHAM, supra note 201, at 219–20.
 259. Id. at 219. 
260. Id. at 219–20.
 261. Id. (describing the trading of SOES Bandits). 
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activities.262  After those practices were exposed, the SEC assessed NASD
with a large penalty for failing to supervise the market makers and the
Nasdaq market was required to reorganize its self-regulatory operations.263 
B. The ECNS Arrive 
Order matching services outside the confines of exchange floors were 
appearing before the beginning of the twenty-first century.264  These
services were called “electronic communications networks” (ECNs) and 
later “alternative trading systems” (ATS).  In the beginning, the ECNs 
were mostly order matching services that paired offsetting buy and sell 
orders from different traders.  Trading on those ECNs was, therefore, order
driven. There was initially no market maker or specialist that maintained a
continuous two-sided market on the newly arrived ECNs, which caused
liquidity concerns.265  This process also meant that the traders did not have
262. Report Pursuant to Section 21 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Regarding the NASD and the NASDAQ Market, Securities Exchange Act Release No.
37542 (Aug. 8, 1996).  The SEC had approved a rule proposed by the National Association 
of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) that had sought to exclude “professional traders” from 
using SOES. That rule was remanded by the District Columbia Court of Appeals to the 
SEC for further action because its definition of what is a professional trader was vague 
and unjustified. Timpinaro v. SEC, 2 F.3d 453, 455, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1993).  The SOES 
bandits and other day traders did raise concerns because they were not required to post 
margin on their trades unless the position was carried overnight. See MARKHAM & HAZEN, 
supra note 216, § 8:11 (describing this concern).  FINRA required “pattern day traders” to 
maintain minimum equity of $25,000 on any day that the customer day trades, and it 
imposed other leverage restrictions, none of which involved registration as a broker-dealer. 
See id. (describing these restrictions).
 263. See Certain Market Making Activities on Nasdaq, Exchange Act Release No. 
34-40900, 1998 WL 919673 (Jan. 11, 1999) at 7–8 (describing the misconduct of Nasdaq
market makers and imposing sanctions on the NASD and Nasdaq). 
264. Technology was also affecting the market in other ways.  For example in 1981, 
commodity market data vendors began to broadcast data through satellites. FM sideband 
was another way to speed such data. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 115, at 
219–20. 
265. The critical role of exchanges has historically been to provide liquidity so that 
owners of stock can sell or liquidate their ownership interest in exchange for cash.  “A 
market with liquidity is one in which the investor can really convert his securities into cash
at a price close to the last sale.” WILLIAM MCCHESNEY MARTIN, JR., THE SECURITIES 
MARKETS: A REPORT, WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 10 (1971) (submitted to the Board of 
Governors of the New York Stock Exchange).  One measure of liquidity is how rapid a 
stock can be bought or sold and another is the width of the spread between bids and offers 
in the market.  The debate over the “black box” exchange of fully automated trading by
the matching of orders to computers with met by the concern that order matching alone 
would not make an effective market: 
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to pay the specialist or market makers the spreads demanded where the 
orders were executed on the NYSE or Nasdaq.266  Consequently, liquidity
on these ECNs depended on the presence of a buyer and seller entering 
opposing matching orders or by acceptance of a quoted bid or offer posted 
by another trader who might be quoting only one side of the market.267 
Nevertheless, ECNs were soon changing the markets.268 
By the end of the twentieth century, ECNs and other non-traditional 
trading venues executed more than twenty percent of volume in Nasdaq
listed shares.269  However, only four percent of exchange listed shares 
were traded on ECNs at that time because NYSE Rule 390 still applied to 
most of the more actively traded shares listed on that exchange.270  The
growth of ECNs exploded as the twenty-first century began, aided by the 
repeal of NYSE Rule 390 in 2000.271 
In the overwhelming majority of stocks, public buying and selling is often 
insufficient to ensure that the order of a willing buyer can always be matched 
with that of a willing seller.  For that reason, markets are created or their quality
is improved my professional traders (specialists or market makers) who put their 
own capital at risk and thereby supply liquidity to the markets. 
BRUCHEY, supra note 154, at 63 (quoting Norman Poser). 
266. Cory Mitchell, ECN Credits: Let Your Broker Pay Your Trading Fees, INVESTOPEDIA
(Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/trading/09/ecn-credits.asp [http://
perma.cc/P5GH-B2EE ]. 
267. Id. 
268. 	  The SEC observed in 1991 that: 
[I]n today’s securities market many small individual investors have relinquished
direct management of their investments to professional investment managers. 
Accordingly, large institutional investors such as public and private pension or
retirement funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, foundations, hedge funds 
and investment managers have grown extraordinarily in number and size, and
have become a predominant type of market participant.  Investor demands for 
returns greater than market averages have caused institutional investors and
investment managers to develop complex and innovative relationships, products, and
trading strategies.  These new investment relationships, products and strategies
have led to increased specialization in investment management and linked capital
markets around the world.  These developments enable institutional investors to
trade large amounts of securities and commodities with stunning swiftness to 
minimize risk or to profit from small differences in valuation. 
Large Trader Reporting System, Exchange Act Release No. 29593, 56 Fed. Reg. 42,550
(Aug. 22, 1991). 
269. Thousands of traders were using electronic trading systems as the twentieth 
century closed to engage in HFTs.  One discount electronic trading firm discounted
commissions and its clientele trading some 95 million shares per day, which was then about
ten percent of Nasdaq trading volumes. MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 216, § 2:39. 
270. MARKHAM, supra note 201, at 31; James McAndrews & Chris Stefanadis, The 
Emergence of Electronic Communications Networks in the U.S. Equity Markets, CURRENT 
ISSUES ECON. &  FIN., Oct. 2000, at 4, http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues/
ci6-12.pdf [http://perma.cc/DE2Y-GKAL]. 
271. The growth of HFTs has been described by one author as flowing from the 
development of ECNs regulated as ATS by the SEC: 
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Both Nasdaq and the NYSE gradually introduced electronic trading into 
their operations until the old school NYSE specialists and Nasdaq market 
makers were pretty much sidelined.272  Indeed, the NYSE specialists changed 
their identity and began calling themselves “liquidity providers.”273  HFTs 
are now dominating trading volumes and providing market liquidity as a 
substitute for the traditional specialist and Nasdaq market maker.274 
Today, floor trading operations are only a ghost of what had once been a 
colorful spectacle often portrayed in news reports as the essence of the 
stock and commodity exchanges.275 
This shift did not escape the SEC’s notice.  In 2010, the SEC noted that 
HFTs and other proprietary trading firms “largely have replaced more 
traditional types of liquidity providers in the equity markets.”276  As the
Individual investors subscribing to ECNs can enter orders electronically into the 
network via a custom computer terminal, and the ECN will then automatically
match and execute contra-side orders.  If no match is identified, then an ECN
order can be posted externally on NASDAQ as soon as it becomes the best price. 
This arrangement allows ECNs to ‘function as a hybrid between a broker for 
counterparties, a broker-dealer or market-maker, and an exchange, and their gain
has been at the expense of NASDAQ.’  The early ECNs provided many benefits 
over past trading venues—including the reduction in costs and trading errors, 
enhancement of operational efficiencies, and other benefits associated with risk
management. Eventually, day-trading firms who originally sought greater market
access to NASDAQ, as well as brokerage firms, began hustling to set up ECNs; 
and the growth rate of ECNs has skyrocketed since 1997.  The growth of these 
ECNs in the late 1990’s led to the wider use of algorithmic trading and eventually
the rise of independent high frequency trading firms.
McGowan, supra note 24, ¶11 (footnotes omitted). 
272. The growth of the ECNS and the demise of the traditional commodity and stock 
exchange floor operations is described in Markham & Harty, supra note 246, at 865, 897. 
273. The NYSE has dropped its role of specialists and supplanted them with “designated
Market Makers” and “Liquidity Providers,” the latter not having market making obligations.
See NYSE Membership, N.Y. STOCK EXCH., https://www.nyse.com/markets/nyse/ 
membership [https://perma.cc/LQA5-F3VY] (last visited Sept. 12, 2015). 
274. See Wallace Turbeville, Reign of the High-Frequency Trading Robots, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 18, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/ 
economic-intelligence/2013/10/18/how-high-frequency-trading-is-taking-over-markets [http:// 
perma.cc/2ERS-RXE3]. 
275. Floor trading has not ceased entirely and at least one exchange, the London 
Metals Exchange, continues to operate as it has in the past.  In 2014, that exchange fined 
some members for failing to stay seated in their assigned seats during trading session, 
blocking the views of other traders. See Francesca Freeman, LME Fines Nine Traders . . . 
For Standing Up, WALL ST. J. (July 21, 2014, 8:48AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/ 
2014/07/21/lme-fines-nine-dealers-for-standing-up/ [http://perma.cc/E3W9-D6YA]. 
276. Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No. 34– 
61358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3607 (proposed Jan. 21, 2010). 
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SEC found: “[t]he use of certain strategies by some proprietary firms has, 
in many trading centers, largely replaced the role of specialists and market 
makers with affirmative and negative [market making] obligations.”277 
The SEC noted, however, that those traders did seek to earn “profits . . . 
from . . . the spread by buying at the bid and selling at the offer.”278 As the
SEC further noted: 
Highly automated exchange systems and liquidity rebates have helped establish
a business model for a new type of professional liquidity provider that is distinct 
from the more traditional exchange specialist and over-the-counter (‘OTC’)
market maker.  In particular, proprietary trading firms and the proprietary trading
desks of multi-service broker-dealers now take advantage of low-latency systems 
and liquidity rebates by submitting large numbers of non-marketable orders
(often cancelling a very high percentage of them), which provide liquidity to the 
market electronically.279 
C. The SEC Responds 
The SEC regulated ECNs under its Regulation ATS (Automated Trading 
Systems), which was adopted in 1998 and required such trading platforms 
to register with the agency as broker-dealers.280  However, traders on such 
platforms were not required to so register unless they were making a 
market in the securities they were trading.281 
SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, Jr. also contended that electronic trading 
should be centralized in a manner that would allow the public display of 
277. Id. See also, Scott S. Powell & Rui Gong, Wall Street’s New Race Toward
Danger, BARRON’S (Mar. 8, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://online.barrons.com/articles/SB12 
6783128753256821 [http://perma.cc/6Y56-RLY5] (“[U]nlike registered broker-dealers, 
many HFT players aren’t regulated or committed to the capital requirements toward
market making in particular stocks.”). 
278.  Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed. Reg. at 3607. 
279. Id. at 3599. 
280. 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.300–303.  See Markham & Harty, supra note 246, at 911–12
(describing the scope and background of Regulation ATS). 
281. Broker-dealer registration has not been required for “traders” and “investors”
who are trading for their own accounts even though their trading is a part of their regular
business and even if their trading is a highly active and for speculative purposes. See 
generally 6 LOUIS LOSS, ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 514 (4th ed. 2011) (describing 
the distinction between a dealer that is required to register as a dealer and a trader).  Among 
the HFTs not required to register were hedge funds and proprietary trading operations 
dealing for the trader’s own account.  See Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 
75 Fed. Reg. at 3606; Hedge Funds, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec. 
gov/answers/hedge.htm [http://perma.cc/Z9S5-5EHK] (last modified Dec. 4, 2012). 
However, in In OX Trading, LLC, [2013–2014 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
¶¶ 80,405–80,406 (Oct. 22, 2013), the SEC found by consent that a firm was required to
be registered as a dealer under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 because it was acting
as a “liquidity provider” on the Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc. (CBOE). 
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orders to all market participants.282  Concerns were also raised over the
fragmentation of the marketplace due to the numerous ECNs then operating. 
Those concerns led to new regulations that were promulgated under 
authority included in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in 1975, which
authorized the SEC to work toward a single marketplace for trading 
securities, that is, a “National Market System” (NMS).283  Before the growth 
of electronic trading, the SEC had taken some timid steps toward such a 
system.284  However, concerns over electronic trading set the SEC on a
course that set the stage for the now ongoing concerns over HFTs. 
In 2005, the SEC adopted Regulation NMS that created a complex set 
of order priority and disclosure rules that were intended to level the 
electronic trading playing field.285  As one source notes: 
The SEC adopted a system that put the premium on speed in execution at a 
specific price, without considering the effect it would have upon the balance 
between market professionals’ duties and responsibilities to customers and the 
effects on the market in general.  Regulation NMS essentially shifted the duties 
282. See SEC Takes Aim at Nasdaq Trading: Rules Are Proposed To End Practices 
by Some Dealers that Are Unfair to Small Investors, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 1, 1995),
http://articles.latimes.com/1995-10-01/opinion/op-54424_1_small-investor [http://perma. 
cc/74Z6-UXN7]. 
283. The concept of a central market system began with a letter from the SEC to 
Congress in 1971, in which the SEC stated that “a major goal and ideal of the securities 
markets” was the “creation of a strong central market system for securities of national 
importance in which all buying and selling interest in these securities could participate and
be represented under a competitive regime.” INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS STUDY, REPORT OF
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 64, at xxiv (1st Sess. 1971). 
The 1971 Report by William Martin, supra note 260.  A SEC Statement in 1972 on 
the future structure of the securities markets, and a SEC statement in 1973 on the structure 
of a central market system laid the groundwork for legislation enacted in 1975 that directed
the SEC to work toward a “national market system.”  See MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 
216, § 2:16 (describing that legislation).  The statutory language chose to term this new 
market structure as a national market system instead of a central market system.  See BRUCHEY, 
supra note 154, at 61–62.  It may have been that the lack of success with a central market 
system in the Soviet Union rendered that term politically suspect. 
284. For a long time, a centerpiece of this new national market system was the 
Consolidated Last-Sale Reporting System, a.k.a., known as the “Consolidated Tape,” that 
began in 1975. BRUCHEY, supra note 154, at 65.  It reported all last sales on the NYSE, 
the American Stock Exchange and various regional exchanges. Id. The SEC also required 
the development of an Intermarket Trading System (ITS) that linked exchanges trading 
the same stocks and required those stocks to executed at the best price available on any 
exchange within the ITS.  WRIGHT, supra note 133, at 61. 
285. SEC Adopts Regulation NMS and Provisions Regarding Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Apr. 7, 2005), https://www.sec.gov/ 
news/press/2005-48.htm [https://perma.cc/LU2V-CBJN]. 
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from the specialists and market makers to the traders themselves by imposing 
rules that required brokers to execute orders in the fastest manner possible, prompting 
brokerage firms and exchanges to interconnect and develop sophisticated computer 
systems to route trades in a maze-like fashion.286 
Regulation NMS sought to assure that customers trading on exchanges 
and other market centers received the best available price for their securities 
on any market where the securities are traded.287  Regulation NMS required 
broker-dealers to execute customer orders at the “national best bid or 
offer” (NBBO).288  Another “improvement” in the NMS envisioned by the
SEC was the “decimalization” of stock market quotes.  This meant that 
stocks could be traded by using quotations with a spread as small as a 
penny versus the historical minimum of minimum quote size of one-eighth
of a dollar.289  This change initially had the effect of allowing specialists and
markets to widen their spreads.  However, as electronic competition grew 
spreads were narrowed by amounts lower than the traditional eighths. 
This had the effect of undercutting market maker profits and discouraging 
them from making commitments for two sided continuous markets. 
As the SEC noted in 2008, electronic trading “has reduced the advantages 
once enjoyed by Floor brokers and specialists.”  The NYSE also claimed
that “the informational advantage has shifted ‘upstairs’ where orders are 
now first ‘shopped’ within a firm and then to others before being sent to 
the floor for execution . . . .”290 
286. Bradley J. Bondi, Memo to Michael Lewis: The Excesses of High-Speed




 287. See Background on Larger Tick Sizes for Mid Cap Stocks, MOD. MKT. INITIATIVE 
(Feb. 3, 2014), http://modernmarketsinitiative.org/background-larger-tick-sizes-mid-cap­
stocks/ [http://perma.cc/9SA4-LR4U].
 288. See SEC, Regulation NMS, Release No. 34-51808, 298–99 (June 9, 2005),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-51808.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q794-8HRX] (adopting
Regulation NMS). 
289. Trading in “eighths” was a historical carryover of the peso that was widely
circulated in America before the Civil War.  That coinage was broken down into eights, 
and gave rise to the term two bits which was equal to a quarter.  Spanish Dollar, http:// 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanish_dollar [http://perma.cc/6B4Y-6G8R] (last modified Aug. 
14, 2015). 
290. Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange LLC; Notice of
Filing of Amendment Nos. 2 and 3 and Order Granting Accelerated Approval to a Proposed 
Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment Nos. 1, 2, and 3, To Create a New NYSE
Market Model, with Certain Components to Operate as a One-Year Pilot, That Would
Alter NYSE’s Priority and Parity Rules, Phase Out Specialists by Creating a Designated
Market Maker, and Provide Market Participants with Additional Abilities to Post Hidden 
Liquidity, Exchange Act Release No. 34-58845, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,379–80 (proposed Oct. 
24, 2008) (footnote omitted). 
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In response to concerns over HFTs, the SEC issued a market a concept
release (Market Concept Release) in January 2010.291  It sought comment
on whether and how HFTs should be defined and regulated.292  The SEC
noted that HFTs were interacting with other investors in various ways, but 
deferred action on regulating any particular type of trade.293  Instead, the
Market Concept Release launched a broad based review by the SEC of the 
current equity market structure.294  The SEC sought to determine whether
its rules had kept pace with the growth of electronic trading, including the 
role of flash orders and other HFT practices.295  That review is still underway
as of the date of this writing. 
HFTs were allowed for a time to have “naked” or “sponsored” access 
to market centers, allowing them direct access to those markets where they 
interfaced with customer orders.  This naked access allowed unregistered
high-frequency traders to access an exchange’s trading facilities without
broker-dealer intermediation or supervision.296 The SEC imposed risk 
291. Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No. 34– 
61358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3606 (proposed Jan. 21, 2010). 
292. Id. at 3594. 
293. Id.
 294. Id.
 295. Id. 
296. As the SEC noted: 
Over the past decade, the proliferation of sophisticated, high-speed trading
technology has changed the way broker-dealers trade for their own accounts and 
as agent for their customers. In addition, customers—particularly sophisticated 
institutions—have themselves begun using technological tools to place orders 
and trade on markets with little or no substantive intermediation by their broker-
dealers.  This, in turn, has given rise to the increased use and reliance on ‘direct 
market access’ or ‘sponsored access’ arrangements.  Under these arrangements, the
broker-dealer allows its customer—whether an institution such as a hedge fund, 
mutual fund, bank or insurance company, an individual, or another broker­
dealer—to use the broker-dealer’s market participant identifier (‘MPID’) or 
other mechanism for the purposes of electronically accessing the exchange or
ATS. With ‘direct market access,’ as commonly understood, the customer’s
orders flow through the broker-dealer’s systems before passing into the markets,
while with ‘sponsored access’ the customer’s orders flow directly into the 
markets without first passing through the broker-dealer’s systems.  In all cases, 
however, whether the broker-dealer is trading for its own account, is trading for
customers through more traditionally intermediated brokerage arrangements, or
is allowing customers direct market access or sponsored access, the broker-dealer 
with market access is legally responsible for all trading activity that occurs under
its MPID. 
Risk Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers with Market Access, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-61379, 75 Fed. Reg. 4007, 4008 (Jan. 26, 2010) (footnotes omitted). 
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supervision requirements on the broker-dealers that had offered naked 
access.297  That rule effectively curbed naked access. 
The SEC Market Concept Release also considered concerns over dark 
pools. The SEC noted that, “[i]n general, dark pools offer trading services 
to institutional investors and others that seek to execute large trading 
interest in a manner that will minimize the movement of prices against the 
trading interest and thereby reduce trading costs.”298 There were, however, 
inequities that resulted from these competing trading venues.  For example,
traders may be able to have their orders filled on a dark pool, “while those 
on publicly displayed markets go unfilled, even though dark pools use the 
information from publicly displayed markets to price the dark pool 
transactions.”299 
This disparity is compounded when dark pools share trading information
with other dark pools, allowing them to “function like private networks 
that exclude the public investor.”300  The SEC proposed rules to limit such 
exclusions by dark pools but has not acted to date on those proposals.301 
The SEC created a large trader reporting system that required large traders 
to register with the SEC.302 It also began enforcing its trade reporting 
requirements for HFTs.303
 297. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-5 (2014). 
298.  Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed. Reg. at 3599. 
299. Fact Sheet: Strengthening the Regulation of Dark Pools, U.S. SEC. &  EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-223-fs.htm [http://perma.cc/ K2K8­
YSVR] (last modified Oct. 23, 2009). 
300. Id.
 301. Id.
 302. Id. FINRA has proposed a rule that would require developers of computer 
algorithms for HFTs to register with FINRA.  The SEC then proposed removing an
exemption from broker-dealer registration for HFTs, which will require them to register
with FINRA. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’nSEC Proposes Rule to Require 
Broker-Dealers Active in Off-Exchange Market to Become Members of National Securities 
Association (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-48.html 
[http://perma.cc/YJ5Q-FUKD]. FINRA also proposed additional trade reporting requirements 
for dark pools. Sarah N. Lynch, Wall Street Regulator Unveils Proposals for Dark Pools, 
Bond Markets, REUTERS (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/19/us­
financial-regulations-finrarules-idUSKBN0HE25G20140919 [http://perma.cc/Z4SJ-FRUT]. 
FINRA has additionally provided guidance on the supervision of HFTS to assure their 
integrity and compliance with trading abuses such as spoofing and “ momentum-ignition” 
strategies. Phyllis Diamond, FINRA to Provide Guidance on Supervising Algo Strategies, 
Systems, 46 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 2068 (Oct. 27, 2014). 
303. Scottrade, Inc., [2014-2014 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 80,468 
(S.E.C. 2014), the SEC found by consent that the respondent had failed to file accurate 
blue sheet information. 	 The SEC noted that: 
Section 17 of the Exchange Act imposes on broker-dealers recordkeeping
requirements that are essential to the Commission’s ability to enforce the federal 
securities laws and to protect investors.  To ensure the continued effectiveness 
of the Commission’s enforcement and regulatory programs, broker-dealers must
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The SEC additionally proposed and adopted a new Regulation SCI 
(Systems Compliance and Integrity) to force electronic trading platforms 
to enhance their programs for preventing system crashes.304  The SEC also 
began more closely monitoring electronic trading platforms.305 
D. Futures Markets and Electronic Trading Concerns 
Like the stock markets, the futures markets had resisted automation, but 
automation soon superseded traditional floor operations and introduced 
the HFT to those markets.306  Like the SEC, the CFTC issued a broad 
concept release seeking comment on regulations needed to prevent market
disruptions by automated trading systems as the result of order errors or 
computer glitches.307  The CFTC concept release also sought to create a
regulatory structure for electronic trading platforms and HFTs.308  Among 
comply with, among other things: Rule 17a-25, requiring that broker-dealers 
submit electronically securities transaction information upon request by the 
Commission’s staff; Rule 17a-4(j), requiring broker-dealers to furnish promptly
true, complete, and current copies of those records upon request by the Commission’s 
staff; and Rule 17a-4(f)(3)(v), requiring broker-dealers to have an audit system 
that provides for accountability regarding the inputting of records required to be 
maintained and preserved. 
Id. at 81,307.
 304. See Scott Patterson, SEC Delays Action on Wall Street Safeguards, WALL ST. 
J., Oct. 8, 2014 (describing this proposed regulation); Scott Patterson, SEC Approves New 
Rule to Address Computer Risks, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2014 (describing adoption of rule).
The industry was also stepping up its monitoring of HFT trading. JPMorgan Chase 
announced on July 21, 2014 that it was creating a unit of some 150 employees to monitor 
electronic trading that might affect its business and to advise clients trading on electronic 
trading platforms. Emily Glazer, Global Finance: J.P. Morgan Puts Electronic Trading in 
the Spotlight, WALL ST. J., July 22, 2014, at C3. 
305. For example, in New York Stock Exchange LLC, [2014 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 80,615 (2014), the SEC found by consent that an exchange and its 
affiliates had implemented rules that created a new or modified business practice without 
approval by the SEC. This included providing co-location services, failing to execute mid­
point passive liquidity orders in an approved manner, and improperly distributing closing 
order imbalance information.  Id. ¶¶ 81,886–88. 
306. See Markham & Harty, supra note 246, at 865 (describing that resistance and
transformation). 
307.  Risk Controls and System Safeguards, supra note 5, at 56,542. 
308. The CFTC has described the interrelated roles of electronic trading platforms 
and automated trading systems as follows:
Automated trading environments have developed in tandem with automated systems 
for both the generation and execution of orders.  Systems related to the generation 
of orders (automated trading systems or ATSs) operate at the beginning of the 
order and trade lifecycle; they reflect a set of rules or instructions (an algorithm) 
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other things, the CFTC concept release noted, with respect to the developm
of automated trading systems (ATS), that: 
ent 
In addition to greater automation and decreased latency, derivatives markets are
increasingly characterized by a high degree of interconnection. ATSs and algorithms
deployed to trade particular products often interact directly and indirectly with
ATSs and algorithms active in other markets and jurisdictions. Increased
interconnectedness is facilitated by electronic access to real-time pricing information, 
automated order execution, and some standardization in communication protocols at
various trading platforms.  ATSs can quickly execute strategies across multiple
markets within very short periods of time.  Often, cross-market activity is driven 
by latent arbitrage opportunities and faster access to multiple markets has led to
a proliferation of strategies that seek to identify and trade on the basis of these
relationships.309 
The CFTC adopted some regulations to deal with the risks posed by this 
new trading environment.  It required futures commission merchants 
(FCMs), swap dealers, and major swap participants that are clearing members 
of an exchange to establish automated pre-order risk-based limits on position 
and order size and margin requirements for all proprietary and customer 
accounts.310  Among other things, the CFTC also considered whether to
require registration of HFTs and identification of their algorithms so that the
agency could monitor them for possible disruptive practices or market
threats.311 
E. Trading Abuses: “Spoofing” and “Layering” 
A by-product of HFTs is a number of trading abuses, such as “spoofing,”
that seek to mislead other traders by posting orders that are not intended 
and related computer systems used to automate the execution of a trading strategy.
ATSs may operate as automated execution programs designed to minimize the 
price impact of large orders; achieve a benchmarked price (e.g., volume-weighted 
average price and time-weighted average price algorithms); or otherwise execute
instructions traditionally provided by a human agent.  They may be employed 
by a range of market participants, with varying degrees of sophistication, for 
both proprietary and customer trading. For example, buy-side firms (such as 
mutual funds and pension funds) may use automated systems and execution 
algorithms to “shred” one or more large orders (called parent order) into a series 
of smaller trades (child orders) to be executed over time.  Such systems can include 
additional algorithms to micro-manage the size, frequency and timing (often
randomized) of child orders. In addition to automated execution, ATSs may also
operate market-making programs; opportunistic, cross-asset and cross-market arbitrage
programs; and a number of other strategies. 
Id. at 56,544. 
309. Id. at 56,546–47 (footnotes omitted). 
310.  17 C.F.R. §§ 1.73, 23.609 (2014). 
311.  Risk Controls and System Safeguards, supra note 5, at 56,559–61. 
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to be executed.312 This is not a new practice. In addition to using courier
pigeons to gain advance information, Nathan Rothschild first entered sell
orders when he wanted to purchase a large quantity of stock. The sell
orders gave rise to rumors that he was selling and Rothschild would then 
acquire his long position at cheaper prices.313  Before the Civil War, 
speculators engaged in what was then called a “scoop” game or “partridge”
scheme in which they enter orders that made it appear that the market was 
weakening. Those orders would lure short sellers into the market and they
would be trapped by orders that were executed at increasing prices.314 
During that era, Jacob Little was able to deceive other traders by 
announcing it would he would not sell a certain stock below $90.315 He 
then began selling the stock secretly at a lower price.316  Such practices
carried over into this century.317 
Electronic spoofing may take several forms.  Initially, it was a fraud 
scheme that falsified the source of emails in order to give the appearance 
that a company had announced news that would affect its stock price.  This 
allowed the perpetrator of the scheme to trade in advance of that
movement.318 This term later also applied to trading schemes in which 
HFT place orders that they intended to cancel before execution in order to
entice other traders into the market.319 
Spoofing as a trading technique also has some regulatory history.
Previously called “flash” trades, such orders were cancelled immediately 
upon communication or withdrawn if not executed immediately after 
312. Bradley Hope, As ‘Spoof’ Trading Persists, Regulators Clamp Down, WALL ST. 
J. (Feb. 22, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-spoofing-traders-dupe-markets­
1424662202 [http://perma.cc/4UYC-RZNF]. 
313. See  JOHN FRANCIS, CHRONICLES AND CHARACTERS OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE 
303–04 (1844). 
314. 1 MARKHAM, supra note 83, at 162 (describing these schemes). 
315. Id. at 161. 
316. Id.
 317. See  TOM BARBASH, ON TOP OF THE WORLD: CANTOR FITZGERALD, HOWARD
LUTNICK & 9/11, at 92–93 (2003) (describing such practices by Merrill Lynch in the U.S. 
Treasury market).  See also JERRY W. MARKHAM, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE HISTORY
OF FINANCIAL MARKET MANIPULATION, 388–89 (2014) (describing other such trading
practices).
 318. See SEC v. Dorozkho, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009) (addressing such a scheme). 
See also MARKHAM, supra note 317, at 334–35 (further describing such schemes).
 319. See MARKHAM, supra note 317, at 334–35 (describing the background of spoofing
concerns). 
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communication.320 Many criticized flash trades.321  However, one of the
SEC National Market System (NMS) rules, which allowed exchanges to 
exclude flash orders from consolidated quotation data disclosures, specifically
authorized such practices.322  The SEC found that, “[f]or those seeking 
liquidity, the flash mechanism may attract additional liquidity from market 
participants who are not willing to display their trading interest publicly.”323 
The SEC did express concern that such trading could be abusive and 
provide an advantage to professional traders over smaller traders, but deferred 
a decision to ban such orders entirely because of their potential value to 
the market.324 
The SEC’s concerns over the value of flash orders was justified.  For 
example, traders might enter orders to “ping” the market like a submarine 
seeking out possible dangers or target opportunities.  Pinging appears to
be a legitimate practice that should be allowed for traders, but should flash
orders so large in volume as to overload competing platforms be
allowed?325  Instead of trying to define the difference between good and 
bad flash trades, the SEC began to regulate such trading through enforcement
actions. Those actions attacked spoofing trades designed to increase the 
national best and offer (NBBO) by not displaying customer orders at 
prices that were better than a market maker’s NBBO posts.  This practice 
was charged as being in violation of SEC rules on limit order displays.326 
The SEC also began charging “layering” as an improper trading practice. 
Layering appears to be simply a more robust form of flash trades, but 
which the SEC views to be fraudulent. The SEC has stated that: 
In general, layering occurs when a trader creates a false appearance of market 
activity by entering multiple non-bona fide orders on one side of the market, at 
generally increasing (or decreasing) prices, in order to move that stock’s price in
320. Elimination of Flash Order Exception from Rule 602 of Regulation NMS, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-60684, 74 Fed. Reg. 48,632 (Sept. 23, 2009). 
321. See “Flash” Trading Controversy in U.S. Raises Issue of Front-Running, 
REUTERS (Aug. 7, 2009), http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2009/08/07/ 
flash-trading-controversy-in-us-raises-issue-of-front-running/ [http://perma.cc/WQ2P-CH42] 
(describing this controversy). 
322.  17 C.F.R. § 242.602(a)(1)(i)(A) (2014). 
323. Elimination of Flash Order Exception from Rule 602 of Regulation NMS, 74 
Fed. Reg. at 48638. 
324.  Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, supra note 3, at 3594. 
325. See Gregory Scopino, The Questionable Legality of High-Speed “Pinging” and
“Front Running” in the Futures Markets, 47 CONN. L. REV. 609 (2015) (questioning the 
role of pinging). 
326. In re Frazee, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8209, 2003 WL 1222734 (S.E.C. 
Mar. 18, 2003). 
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a direction where the trader intends to induce others to buy (or sell) at a price 
altered by the non-bona fide orders.327 
HFTs were also criticized for using complex orders to game other 
aspects of the SEC’s NMS.  One particularly unwieldy aspect of SEC 
Regulation NMS is its prohibition against quoting a “locked” market in 
which the buy and sell quotes are the same.  In theory, the trades should 
cross and execute but do not because one or the other party may not want
to pay the exchange fee associated with the execution.328  That prohibition 
gave rise to various trading strategies to avoid the effect of that locked 
market prohibition, including complex “hide not slide” orders that were 
criticized in the press.329  The hide-not-slide orders were designed to give
priority to undisplayed orders when the market unlocked.330  The SEC has 
also sought sanctions where a trading platform uses customer information 
for its own trading advantage.331
 327. In re Biremis Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 34-68456, 2012 WL 6587520
(S.E.C. Dec. 18, 2012). The SEC has also described layering as follows: 
Layering concerns the use of non-bona fide orders, or orders that the trader does 
not intend to have executed, to induce others to buy or sell the security at a price 
not representative of actual supply and demand.  More specifically, a trader
places a buy (or sell) order that is intended to be executed, and then immediately
enters numerous non-bona fide sell (or buy) orders for the purpose of attracting
interest to the bona fide order. These non-bona fide orders are not intended to 
be executed.  The nature of these orders is to induce, or trick, other market 
participants to execute against the initial, bona fide order.  Immediately after the 
execution against the bona fide order, the trader cancels the open, non-bona fide 
orders, and repeats this strategy on the opposite side of the market to close out 
the position. 
Hold Brothers On-Line Investment Services, LLC, 2012 LEXIS 3029 (S.E.C. Sept. 25,
2012).
 328. Cameron Smith, Stock Investors Can Handle the Truth, WALL ST. J., June 3, 
2014, at A11. 
329. See Scott Patterson & Jenny Strasburg, For Superfast Stock Traders, A Way to 
Jump Ahead in Line, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2012, at A1 (describing these orders). 
330. See id. (describing this practice). 
331.  A Citigroup, Inc. affiliate agreed to pay $5 million to settle SEC charges that it
failed to protect the confidential information of customers trading on its ECN, LavaFlow 
Inc.  That information involved non-displayed orders and was given to a Citigroup affiliate 
for its trading. Michael Calia, Citigroup Unit Pays Record Fine Over Alternative Trading 
System, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2014, at B5. See also LavaFlow, Inc., [2014 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 80,652 (2014).  In Liquidnet, Inc., [2014 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 80,626 (2014), the SEC by consent sanctioned a dark
pool that was registered as an ATS for sharing confidential information about customer
trading with a business unit outside the dark pool. 
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Mary Jo White, the SEC Chair, announced in June 2014 that she had 
directed the SEC staff to formulate rules that would identify and prohibit 
disruptive HFT trading strategies during volatile market conditions.  She 
stated that the SEC “should not roll back the technology clock or prohibit
algorithmic trading,” but that it had to assess “the extent to which specific 
elements of the computer-driven trading environment may be working 
against investors rather than for them.”332 White also questioned, “whether 
the increasingly expensive search for speed has passed the point of
diminishing returns.”333 She stated that the SEC would also be examining 
“mechanisms designed to minimize speed advantages.”334 White further 
indicated the SEC might impose affirmative market making obligations 
on HFTs, as had been done in the past to offset the time and place advantages
of market makers and specialists on the NYSE and Nasdaq.335 
Like the SEC, the CFTC encountered concerns over HFT trading practices. 
Section 747 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank) allowed the CFTC to attack “spoofing”
—bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before
execution.336  Section 747 also allowed the CFTC to attack other “disruptive”
trading practices, such as violating the bids and offers of other traders and
“banging the close.”337 
332. Mary Jo White, Enhancing Our Equity Market Structure, Address Before 
Sandler O’Neill & Partners, L.P. Global Exchange and Brokerage Conference New York, 




 335. Id. 
336. 7 U.S.C. § 6(c) (2012) (which amended Section 4c of the Commodity Exchange 
Act of 1936 (CEA)). Section 4c had previously prohibited certain improper trading 
practices such as “wash” sales, “accommodation” trades and “fictitious” trades. See 13
JERRY W. MARKHAM, COMMODITIES REGULATION: FRAUD, MANIPULATION & OTHER
CLAIMS, ch. 14 (2014) (describing those practices). See also MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra 
note 216, § 9:17.80 (describing spoofing). 
337. 7 U.S.C. § 6(c).  Banging the close involves manipulating the closing price of
a futures or options contract in order to reduce margin requirements or to affect the price 
of a cash market position.  See DiPlacido v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 364 F. 
App’x. 657 (2d Cir. 2009) (a pre-Dodd-Frank case attacking such practices as
manipulation).  The SEC and the Justice Department have also brought cases charging 
violations in connection with efforts to manipulate closing prices. See MARKHAM, supra
note 317, at 333–34 (describing those cases).  See also, e.g., Athena Capital Research, LLC, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-73369, 2014 WL 5282074 (Oct. 16, 2014) (settlement of
banging the close case); Sarah N. Lynch, New York High-Speed Trading Firm Settles SEC 
Charges Over Manipulation, REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2014, 4:46PM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2014/10/16/us-sec-highspeed-idUSKCN0I52E620141016 [http://perma.cc/PH4E-Z75W] 
(describing how a HFT trader settled with the SEC over alleged manipulation involving closing
prices). 
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The CFTC subsequently issued an interpretation of the scope of the 
prohibition in Section 747 of Dodd-Frank.  Among other things, that
interpretation stated its prohibitions apply to any trading that involves 
buying at a price higher than the lowest available price or selling at a price 
lower than the highest available price.338  The CFTC also brought spoofing 
charges against traders and one trader was indicted for such activity after 
settling with the CFTC.339 
VI. INFORMATION IS A COMMODITY 
There has been much argument over whether HFTs add value to the 
market by enhancing liquidity.340  However, that debate seems bit pointless
338. Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 78 Fed. Reg. 31,890 (May 28, 2013).  The 
CME Group also adopted a rule prohibiting disruptive trading practices such as quote 
stuffing that seeks to overwhelm the quotations of another market participant, disorderly
trading during closing periods, and spoofing. CME Group Files Rule to Prohibit 
Disruptive Practices, 46 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1797 (Sept. 15, 2014). 
339. Kara Scannell & Gregory Meyer, Trader Faces Criminal Spoofing Charges, 
FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 2, 2014.  Questions have been raised over whether that spoofing
actually injured anyone other than other HFTs.  Matt Levine, Prosecutors Catch a
Spoofing Panther, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Oct. 2, 2014, 5:15PM), http://www.bloomberg 
view.com/articles/2014-10-02/prosecutors-catch-a-spoofing-panther [http://perma.cc/E88V­
YBD9]. Another trader settled a CFTC manipulation case for $1.56 million, which charged 
that the trader repeatedly entered and cancelled orders that he did not plan to have executed 
in order to provide the false appearance of liquidity in wheat futures contracts.  Broker 
Agrees to Pay $1.56M in Manipulation Case, 46 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1969 (Oct. 
6, 2014).  The commodity exchanges were also bringing numerous spoofing claims against 
traders. Gregory Meyer & Kara Scannell, Chicago Prosecutor Gets Tough on ‘Spoofing,’
FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 8, 2014.  Still another trader was charged in April 2015 by the 
CFTC and the Justice Department with spoofing that contributed to the Flash Crash in 
May 2010. Press Release, U.S. Commodity Future Trading Comm’n, CFTC Charges U.K. 
Resident Navinder Singh Sarao and His Company Nav Sarao Futures Limited PLC with
Price Manipulation and Spoofing (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Press 
Releases/pr7156-15 [http://perma.cc/BKF6-Z6YC]. 
340. For example, the CBOE has claimed that: “Generally speaking, the evolution
of high frequency trading has helped limit spreads and increase market liquidity— 
efficiencies that benefit all market participants.” High Frequency Trading: Progress or 
Problem?, CBOE, http://www.cboe.com/AboutCBOE/MediaHub/high-frequency-trading/
views.aspx [http://perma.cc/DTC6-BYPG] (last visited Sept. 12, 2015 ).  See, e.g., Markus
Baldauf & Joshua Mollner, The Private Value of Speed: Systematic Advantages of Fast 
Liquidity Providers, STANFORD UNIV. ECON. DEP’T, May 29, 2014; Bradley Hope, A High-
Speed Trader Looks To Slow Down Critics, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 15, 2014), http:// 
online.wsj.com/articles/a-high-speed-trader-looks-to-slow-down-critics-1413318872?mod 
=dist_smartbrief [http://perma.cc/5VU7-EXGC]; Matthew O’Brien, Everything You Need
To Know About High Frequency Trading, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.
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because, as volume figures indicate,341  HFTs are supplanting the traditional 
market makers on both the stock and futures exchanges.  Criticism of HFT
trading practices that may be abusive are a matter of appropriate regulatory
concern, but that begs the questions of what is abusive and how such
practices should be regulated. 
Identification of an abuse is itself problematic, since not every
advantage or stratagem is abusive even if it provides advantage to its user
at the expense of others. Pinging, for example, seems legitimate because 
it is merely seeking out trading interest, but when does pinging become
illegal spoofing?  Once identified as abusive, prohibited practices could 
be spotted by regulatory authorities through their own algorithms.342  That
would add certainty to the market and free traders of guessing what is or
is not permitted.343  In the meantime, the regulators are bringing cases on 
an ad hoc basis that adds little to the debate over the proper role and
regulation of HFTs.344 
This focus on trading abuses actually masks the real concern of
regulators—HFTs take advantage of asymmetrical access to information
gained by their high-speed trading abilities.  This concern has even spawned
proposals to slow down the HFTs and thereby remove their high-speed
advantages.  One proposal would label HFTs as “e-specialist brokers” and
handicap those registrants by preventing them from using exchange data
feeds. This would prevent the HFTs from getting a jump on other traders.345 
Another approach is to slow everyone down to the same speed.  For 
example, IEX is a dark pool that uses a 350 micro-second delay for orders 
theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/04/everything-you-need-to-know-about-high­
frequency-trading/360411/ [http://perma.cc/ZB9X-NYUL]; Lauren Oppenheimer & John 
Vahey, The Need For Speed, CAPITAL MKTS. INITIATIVE, 1, 1 (July 2013), http:// 
content.thirdway.org/publications/722/Third_Way_Report_-_The_Need_For_Speed.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/8T3J-BWZN]; Matthew Philips, How The Robots Lost: High Frequency 
Trading’s Rise and Fall, BLOOMBERG  (June 6, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/
articles/2013-06-06/how-the-robots-lost-high-frequency-tradings-rise-and-fall [http://perma.
cc/BA3Z-7F4N].
 341. See supra notes 14–16. 
342. FINRA seems to be moving in this direction. FINRA Board OK’s Proposals 
on Dark Pools, Algorithmic Trading, Fixed Income Markets, 46 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 1825 
(Sept. 22, 2014). 
343. See MARKHAM, LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 310, at 334–35 (describing
such an approach).  See also Gregory Scopino, Do Automated Trading Systems Dream of 
Manipulating the Price of Futures Contracts? Policing Markets for Improper Trading 
Practices by Algorithmic Robots, 66 FLA. L. REV. 221, 283–84 (2015) (advocating a 
supervisory requirement for firms with HFTs). 
344. For example, the SEC trumpeted its prosecution of an HFT over a net capital 
violation. See HFT Firm Agrees to Record SEC Fine For Alleged Violations of Net 
Capital Rule, 46 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1824 (Sept. 22, 2014). 
345. Report: “E-Specialist” Label Can Reduce HFT Issues, 46 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 
(BNA) 1775 (Sept. 15, 2014). 
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entered into its system for execution in order.  That delay seeks to equalize 
trading opportunities and preclude the front running of customer orders.346 
IEX was also seeking to compete with the dark pools by allowing trading 
for free where buy and sell orders match.  Other trades on IEX were
assessed a fee of nine cents per 100 shares and there were no maker/taker
payments to encourage liquidity by HFT orders.  Broker-dealers would be 
given priority over other traders, including HFTs.347 
A number of other fixes for HFT trading have been proposed, including 
a widening of tick sizes for market quotes.  That would be a reversal of a 
prior SEC action that reduced tick sizes to a penny from the traditional 1/ 
16 and 1/8 of a dollar.  Moreover, wider spreads are an indication of an
illiquid and inefficient market, so why require inefficiency?  The SEC also
considered a requirement that trades be conducted on dark pools only at 
prices better than those available on public markets.348 
Again, these efforts are directed toward the creation of a level playing 
field for all traders. However, as history has shown, traders have always 
sought information advantages that will allow them to profit at the expense
of slower competitors. It would seem strange to historians if governments 
had prohibited the use of mirrors, smoke signals, or courier pigeons in 
trading securities.  Similarly, banning fast ships and express coaches would 
also be laughable to us today if such action had been taken in order to curb 
the advantages of speculators. 
This misguided attack on informational advantages is fueled by the 
SEC’s fixation on insider trading, which it initially based on a theory that 
346. Scott Patterson, Regulator Hired by Upstart Firm, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2014,
at C5.  Other proposals for slowing HFTS include minimum order exposure time, batch
auctions in which the exchange will periodically execute orders at price where most bids 
and offers match, and a transaction tax that would penalize rapid trading.  See SHORTER & 
MILLER, supra note 37, at 34–36. 
347. Bradley Hope, IEX Plan Aims to Drain ‘Dark Pools’, WALL ST. J., July 7, 2014, 
at C1. 
348. Andrew Ackerman & Bradley Hope, SEC Set to Spur Exchange Trading, WALL 
ST. J., May 27, 2014, at C1. See also Andy Kessler, High-Frequency Trading Needs One 
Quick Fix, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2014, at A15 (reporting that one fix for NMS was 
suggested as requiring best execution, rather than best price and by increasing decimalization
to minimum five cent spreads).  See  JEFF CASTURA ET AL., MARKET EFFICIENCY AND 
MICROSTRUCTURE EVOLUTION IN U.S. EQUITY MARKETS: A HIGH-FREQUENCY PERSPECTIVE
(2010), http://finlin.wharton.upenn.edu/department/Seminar/micro/Litzenberger_transient
_vol5_2010.pdf [http://perma.cc/GH8B-UZYZ] (discussing role of HFTs in narrowing 
spreads). 
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unequal access to information that is used to trade stocks is fraudulent.349 
However, an insider trading charge requires proof of some misappropriation
of information or obtaining or using information in breach of a fiduciary
duty.350  However, HFTs are neither misappropriating information nor
breaching any fiduciary duty.  Moreover, the Supreme Court has rejected
the SEC’s claims for equal access to information even in insider trading 
cases. The Supreme Court held in Chiarella v. United States351 that “[a]
duty to disclose . . . does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic 
market information.”352  “Moreover, neither the Congress nor the [Securities
and Exchange] Commission ever has adopted a parity-of-information 
rule. Instead, the problems caused by misuse of market information have 
been addressed by detailed and sophisticated regulation that recognizes 
when use of market information may not harm operation of the securities 
markets.”353  This should signal a focus on rules that attack particular
trades that are fraudulent and not on the facts that one trader is faster than 
another is or has better information. 
The equal access to information theory has also been solidly rejected in 
the futures markets beginning early in the country’s history.  In an 1817 
decision written by Justice John Marshall in Laidlaw v. Organ, the 
349. The equal access to information insider trading theory had been created out of
whole cloth by the SEC in a 1961 consent order. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907
(1961). Such a doctrine had been rejected at common law. See Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186
N.E. 659, 611 (Sup. Mass. 1933).  The SEC had not posited such a theory until the 1961 
consent decree.  See MARKHAM, supra note 317, at 138 (describing this development).  The
SEC then began using insider trading cases as the centerpiece of its enforcement efforts. See, 
e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 839–41 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied
sub nom., Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
350.  United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 667 (1987). 
351.  Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 223 (1980). 
352. Id. at 235. 
353. Id. at 233. See also, Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 651, 659–60 (1983) (further 
circumscribing the SEC’s equal access to information theory). In United States v.
Finnerty, 533 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008), the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the 
defendant’s convictions for interpositioning or front running of customer trades because 
there was “no evidence that Finnerty conveyed an impression that was misleading, whether 
or not it could have a bearing on a victim’s investment decision in connection with a 
security.” Id. at 149. The Court further stated that: 
It may be that Finnerty unfairly profited from superior information.  But “not 
every instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under § 
10(b).” Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232, 100 S. Ct. 1108, 63 L. Ed. 
2d 348 (1980).  And characterizing Finnerty’s conduct as “self-evidently deceptive” 
is conclusory; there must be some proof of manipulation or a false statement, 
breach of a duty to disclose, or deceptive communicative conduct. “Section
10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be 
fraud.”
  Id. at 234–35. 
353. Id. at 150. 
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Supreme Court held that a purchaser of tobacco had no duty to disclose to 
the seller the buyer’s prior non-public knowledge of the signing of the 
Treaty of Ghent.354  Tobacco prices increased substantially when the
existence of the treaty became publicly known.355 
Congress amended the CEA in 2008 to adopt the approach taken in 
Laidlaw v. Organ.356  Congress then added a proviso to the anti-fraud 
provisions of Section 4b of the CEA357 that states its prohibitions do not
require disclosure of: 
nonpublic information that may be material to the market price, rate, or level of
the commodity or transaction, except as necessary to make any statement made
to the other person in or in connection with the transaction not misleading in any 
material respect.358 
Section 753 of the Dodd-Frank Act added language to the CEA that is 
modeled after Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934359 and 
used by the SEC for its insider trader cases.360  However, Section 753 of
Dodd-Frank also adopted the language from the 2008 legislation that 
proscribes the CFTC from adopting regulations that would include insider 
trading concepts such as those advocated by the SEC.361 
Section 753 of Dodd-Frank prohibits any “manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance” in violation of CFTC rules adopted within one year
of the enactment of Dodd-Frank.362  The CFTC promulgated Rule 180.1 
354.  Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. 178, 195 (1817). 
355. In rejecting that claim, Justice Marshall’s opinion tracked that of the proviso 
added to Section 4b of the CEA.  He stated: 
The question in this case is, whether the intelligence of extrinsic circumstances, 
which might influence the price of the commodity, and which was exclusively
within the knowledge of the vendee, ought to have been communicated by him 
to the vendor? The court is of the opinion that he was not bound to communicate 
it. It would be difficult to circumscribe the contrary doctrine within proper
limits, where the means of intelligence are equally accessible to both parties. 
But at the same time, each party must take care not to say or do anything tending
to impose upon the other. 
Id. at 195. 
356. Id.; 7 U.S.C. § 6b(b) (2012). 
357.  7 U.S.C. § 6b (2012). 
358.  7 U.S.C. § 6b(b) (2012). 
359.  15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
360.  Section 753 of Dodd-Frank also added a new special provision price manipulations
through “false reporting.”  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
§ 753. 
361. Id.
 362. Id. 
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to implement that provision.363 In doing so, the CFTC refused to adopt a
broad SEC insider trading prohibition because of the Laidlaw like 
language in Section 753 of the Dodd-Frank Act.  The CFTC stated that it 
is not a violation Rule 180.1 “to withhold information that a market 
participant lawfully possesses about market conditions . . . either in an 
anonymous market setting or in bilateral negotiations . . . .”364  The CFTC
thus recognized “that unlike securities markets, derivatives markets have 
long operated in a way that allows for market participants to trade on the
basis of lawfully obtained material nonpublic information.365 The CEA’s
approach to asymmetrical access to information should apply equally to 
informational advantages from high-speed trading.
There are sound reasons why information should not be regulated in the
absence of fraud. Information is a commodity that has value and for which
its holder deserves payment.  This simple and basic concept is found 
everywhere in markets and in daily commerce.  Consider the purchase of
a newspaper bought by a reader to obtain the information it contains.  We 
all happily pay our doctor bills to obtain the information provided by the 
doctor’s diagnosis.  Teachers are paid to disseminate information, as are 
store clerks, computer programmers and preachers.  So why should 
special knowledge obtained by a trader be any different?  Traders holding 
asymmetrical information or speed advantages should be rewarded for
their effort and not punished.
In any event, there is the practical problem that possession of information 
is by its very nature asymmetrical.  It is not possible for everyone to be 
informed of everything all the time.  Some traders will always have a 
possession or speed advantage over other traders. Some traders will gain 
access to market moving information before others. Indeed, and not a little 
ironically, HFTs were using their ability to access the SEC’s public 
company filings faster than other traders through direct feeds sold by the 
SEC and then trade on that information before others receiving the information 
on the Internet could act.366  This gave HFTs an advantage of as much as
ten seconds.367 
363.  17 C.F.R. § 180.1 (2014). 
364. CFTC, Prohibition on Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 76 Fed. Reg. 
41,398, 41,402 (July 14, 2011). 
365. Id. at 41,403. 
366. Ryan Tracey & Scott Patterson, Fast Traders are Getting Data from SEC 
Seconds Early, WALL ST. J., (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fast-traders-are­
getting-data-from-sec-seconds-early-1414539997 [http://perma.cc/675T-4N34]. 
367. Id. Dave Michaels, Senators Urge SEC to Fix Unequal Access to Market Data, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-11-03/senators-urge- 
sec-s-white-to-fix-unequal-access-to-market-data.html [http://perma.cc/ZT5H-LF65]. 
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Market moving information should be given equal dignity with any 
other article of commerce.  This means, for example, that exchanges should 
be able to charge access fees for the information they provide without 
regulation by a fee setting agency like the SEC.368  If exchanges want to 
charge higher fees for better access, then they should be allowed to do so. 
Exchanges exist because of the information they disseminate, and they 
should be compensated for that service.  That same logic applies to exchange 
co-location services for which the exchanges charge fees.369 
Similarly, exchange incentive fees that vary for “makers” of orders and 
those charged to “takers” of orders, which have engendered much criticism,
should also be left to the trading platforms to set.  Those incentives are 
intended to encourage liquidity and are desirable and provide information
that is valuable to the market.  After all, the specialists and Nasdaq market
makers had long profited from the spread between purchase and sale 
orders. They were applauded for doing so because of the liquidity they 
provided to the market. HFTS are no less entitled to rewards for providing 
liquidity.
Further, as the SEC has noted, “[i]nvestors need not . . . always be 
price-takers and accept whatever prices the other side of the market is 
offering at the moment.  They can participate in price competition by 
368. In NetCoalition v. SEC, 715 F.3d 342 344, 354 (D.C. Cir. 2013), the D.C. 
Circuit dismissed a case seeking to require the SEC to suspend the fee setting rules of
exchanges for the acquisition of proprietary market data. The court noted that in an earlier 
decision it had set aside the SEC’s approval of an exchange rule because of faulty
reasoning. Id. However, the Dodd-Frank Act subsequently removed the requirement that 
the SEC approve such fees. 
369. Interestingly, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), 
the primary trade organization representing the broker-dealer community is advocating the 
elimination or sharp reduction of exchange access fees.  SIFMA is also urging the 
imposition of a requirement that all users of market data have access to data at the same
time.  See SIFMA Publishes Recommendations for Enhancing Fairness, Stability, and 
Transparency in US Equity Markets, SIFMA (July 14, 2014), http://www.sifma.org/ 
newsroom/2014/sifma-publishes-recommendations-for-enhancing-fairness-stability-and­
transparency-in-us-equity-markets/ [http://perma.cc/F3AT-NUGP].  However, a district 
court dismissed state law claims by a subscriber to an exchange information feed that 
received information only after the preferred access given to HFTs.  The court held that
the state law claims were preempted because the SEC had examined this area and
concluded that such preference was permissible.  The court further held that, even if not 
preempted, there was no justiciable claim under state law.  Lanier v. BATS Exchange, 
Inc., 2015 WL 191446 (S.D.N.Y.). 
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tain better prices than the market is offering.”370 
Whatever their particular trading strategy, investors that participate in price
competition by offering immediate liquidity in a security are seeking primarily to
interact with investor order flow on the other side of the market.  Assuring an 
opportunity for this type of direct interaction between investors without the 
intervention of a dealer is one of the principal objectives of the national market 
system.371 
The HFTs in all events do not need to be slowed down.  This is an era 
of computers and advocating a return to ink quills and foolscap is nonsense. 
The HFT is simply another step that began with courier pigeons and smoke
signals and now is progressing to microwaves.  One can only wonder what
the next generation will bring to the long running effort to gain trading 
advantage by faster information media.
VII. CONCLUSION 
The use of high-speed methods for the transmittal of information in
order to obtain an edge on trading over other traders is a practice that is as 
old as the markets themselves.  From carrier pigeons to laser technology, 
time has shown that information is a valuable commodity that traders 
naturally use to seek a profit. By doing so, they are transmitting that 
information to the market through their trading and provide market 
liquidity and better market efficiency. 
370. Commission’s Request for Comment on Market Fragmentation Release No. 
34–42450 65 Fed. Reg. 10577, 10581 (Feb. 28, 2000). 	 The SEC also noted that: 
Another type of implicit transaction cost reflected in the price of a security is
short-term price volatility caused by temporary imbalances in trading interest. 
For example, a significant implicit cost for large investors (who often represent 
the consolidated investments of many individuals) is the price impact that their
large trades can have on the market.  Indeed, disclosure of these large orders can 
reduce the likelihood of their being filled.  Consequently, large investors often 
seek ways to interact with order flow and participate in price competition without
submitting a limit order that would display the full extent of their trading interest
to the market. Among the ways large investors can achieve this objective are: 
(1) To have their orders represented on the floor of an exchange market; (2) to
submit their orders to a market center that offers a limit order book with a reserve 
size feature; or (3) to use a trading mechanism that permits some form of 
“hidden” interest to interact with the other side of the market.  A market structure 
that facilitates maximum interaction of trading interest can produce price 
competition within displayed prices by providing a forum for the representation
of undisclosed orders. 
Id. (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). 
371. Id. at 10581 (footnote omitted). 
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